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This thesis will address the relative ability of the
command and control systems of the United States and Soviet
Union to support a protracted nuclear war. It will address
the organizations as well as the various systems used to
support the respective National Command Authorities. This
includes the threat warning and attack assessment equipment
used to determine strategic and tactical warning, the
communications equipment used to alert forces of increased
readiness and the contribution of these systems in the
conduct of nuclear strikes, if required. It also includes
a review of the technical factors associated with the
performance of C 3 in a nuclear environment. The result is a
net assessment of the two command and control systems that
highlights the strengths and weaknesses inherent in each.
Specific recommendations, such as better aircraft support
schemes and more robust command and control systems, are
developed to help enhance the United States' position
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I . INTRODUCTION
Today, the United States and Soviet Union each possess
extensive strategic command and control organizations.
Both however, have evolved differently and each country's
system has distinct advantages and disadvantages. These
differences must be considered in the context of how the
military is organized and what procedures guide nuclear
weapons control functions.
The Soviet Union has very precisely defined concepts of
command and control which focus on a wartime environment.
It utilizes a rigorous design process when creating a
command and control system, and by having a specific focus
for its military, the supporting systems can be much easier
to build and implement. Each component is built to suit a
specific purpose and contributes to the overall mission of
the system whether it is for tactical forces or strategic
command and control of nuclear forces. The emphasis is on
cooordinated and large scale use of conventional forces in
any nuclear conflict, and it has adapted the command and
control systems to be able to execute nuclear operations if
required.
The United States, on the other hand, tends to have a
more loosely defined concept of command and control and
places greater emphasis on the capabilities of available
technology. The strategic systems currently in place have
usually evolved due to a recurring deficiency in their
operational use rather than from planning the system from
the top down. This chapter will cover the command and
control organizations in the United States and Soviet Union
and will set the stage for analysis of current systems and
and net assessment in Chapters III, IV, and VI.
A. U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL
With the development and use of the first atomic device,
the United States found itself in a unique military and
political position. With a weapon of this power, the
requirement for a strict and clearly defined command and
control organization had to be formulated. Over the ensuing
years, this requirement has manifested itself in a strategic
command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3 I)
structure that has evolved into a system designed to support
current political doctrine.
Although considered by the Soviet Union for years in
the design of their systems, the United States has only
recently begun to develop C 3 I systems which address the
aspect of survivability in the context of maintaining a
sustained warfighting capability in a nuclear
confrontation. Presidential Directive (PD) 59 and National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 13 have set the stage
for the United States to place its nuclear forces and their
supporting command and control structures in a position
2
where they have the capability to carry out a protracted
nuclear conflict and "win" by denying the Soviet Union its
war aims. 1
The current command and control system is still in a
state of evolution. The changes occurring within the field
of C 3 are both technically challenging and based on the
drive to provide a strategic command and control system
still containing the important aspects of flexibility,
redundancy, endurance, reliability, security, and, most
important, survivability.
The United States' strategic command and control
network is organized in a manner which allows for close
control over the employment of nuclear weapons. The system
utilized for exercising this control is the World Wide
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) . It is
designed to support the National Command Authority (NCA)
during either a nuclear or conventional conflict. It
operates through and serves the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
,
while subordinate command organizations support the Unified
and Specified Commanders and their Service component
commanders. 2
1 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear
Forces (New Haven: Yale University, 1983), p. 88.
2 Kenneth L. Moll, Strategic Command and Control
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, Congressional
Research Service, 19 November 1980), p. 6.
In carrying out the mission of maintaining a viable
command and control network, the United States utilizes a
complex command and control architecture. The equipment
supporting it includes fixed sight radars, a variety of
communications equipment designed to employ the entire
electromagnetic spectrum, and intelligence gathering
systems to provide the NCA with processed information
capable of supporting real-time decisionmaking. One aspect
of command and control which should be addressed is its
contribution to maintaining deterrence.
A robust command and control system is often seen as a
prime ingredient in the deterrent equation. By maintaining
a C 3 I system capable of functioning in a nuclear
environment, the desire for either the United States or the
Soviet Union to initiate an attack is hopefully decreased
since the chances of successfully executing a decapitating
strike are diminished. Deterrence could be assumed to flow
from the fact that the system, if exercised in a conflict,
could properly function, and continuity of control could be
maintained. This point is emphasized by Blair in his book
Strategic Command and Control :
Deficiencies in command performance could be cause for
serious concern regardless of the resilience of the
forces and the strategy to which they are subordinated.
If command and control fails, nothing else matters. 3
3 Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control,
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 4.
Also, with a survivable command and control system, the
ability to communicate intentions and actions contributes to
maintaining a stable relationship between the countries.
It has been noted that the desire for deterrence also
stems from sound military theory. The view which holds that
deterrence is a function of mutual societal vulnerability
addresses the possibility that command instability may
result in unintended conflict or an uncontrolled escalation
of a conflict in progress. The opposite tack which holds
that deterrence flows from the promise of proficient
military conduct fails to take into account that if command
instability occurs, the conflict cannot be fought in any
militarily intelligent fashion. 4 The important intertwining
of an enduring command and control system and crisis
stability has been addressed by Steinbruner:
The most severe problems with the concept of stability
result from the fact that its technical definition has
not included a critical dimension of strategic
capability: namely the physical and organizational
arrangements for exercising deliberate command of
strategic forces. 5
Although the United States has chosen the strategic path of
developing an enduring and survivable C 3 I system for
strategic forces, this utilization of resources has been
claimed by some to be an inefficient use of resources.
4 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style
(Lanham: Hamilton Press, 1986), p. 153.
5John Steinbruner, "National Security and the Concept
of Strategic Stability," Journal of Conflict Resolution 22,
no. 3 (September 1978): p. 413.
By seeking to field this type of system, the United
States is investing funding and resources that may be better
spent in preparing for a short nuclear war. The critical
aspects concerning the much needed hardening of ICBM and
national command authority bunkers is frequently brought up.
Also, the ability to maintain forces at higher generated
alert postures than may occur in a crisis can put a severe
strain on logistics requirements. 6 These concerns are
valid, but the requirement to plan for a worst case
scenario—a protracted nuclear war—must be strived toward.
By expending resources in this manner, many of the concerns
about resource utilization will be taken care of as updated
and new systems become operational.
B. SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Soviet Union approaches the command and control of
its nuclear forces in a manner quite different from the
United States. The leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces is
vested in the Defense Council. The Defense Council is set
up in peacetime to facilitate any possible transition to war
that may be required, hence, it is generally viewed as a
wartime organization. The daily peacetime activities of
the military are controlled by the Ministry of Defense which
has eleven deputy ministers, five of which control the main
6Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Planning and Strategic Planning
Philadelphia Policy Papers (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy
Research Institute, 1984), p. 24.
bulwark of the Soviet defenses. The five main services are
the Strategic Rocket Forces, Ground Forces, Navy, Air
Defense Forces, and Air Forces. The remaining six deputy
defense ministers oversee civil defense, rear services, the
main inspectorate, construction and billeting, personnel,
and armaments. 7
As with the United States, the Soviet Union realizes
and stresses the important aspects required in any command
and control system. There are, however, some important
differences. The Soviet Union places more importance on
viewing the C 3 I process as a system which serves as a
"force multiplier". 8 The concept of force multiplier gives
a commander in the field or country an added advantage
against the enemy by allowing him to employ better data
processing techniques, communications, and decisionmaking
tools, giving them the overall qualitative edge needed for
victory. They also place an increased emphasis on the
survivability of their strategic systems designed to support
a nuclear conflict. This emphasis on survivability has been
the driving force behind the demand for leadership survival
and a capability to continue a nuclear confrontation while
maintaining political control of their nuclear forces.
7Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power; An
Assessment of the Threat 1988 (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 13.
8James G. Taylor, "Cybernetic Concepts and Troop




In the event of a crisis, the Soviet Union's political
and military organizations would undergo slight
modifications. The Defense Council will be modified to
resemble the World War II State Defense Council, or VGK
Stavka, and will be responsible for the planning of
strategic operations and overseeing the wartime development
of the armed forces. The control of the strategic nuclear
forces will be directly controlled by them and assigned
strike missions as required. 9
To support this effort, the Soviet Union has built an
extensive array of command and control facilities that are
designed to support the nation's political and military
leadership. Communications are carried out by a variety of
means including land-lines, radiotelephone, microwaves, and
satellites. These facilities all incorporate a degree of
survivability through physical hardening, EMP hardening, or
redundancy. There is also a program of deep underground
shelters designed to protect the leadership and provide
them with a degree of survivability allowing conduct of a
protracted conflict. 10 When viewed within the concept of
Soviet military strategy and their "vitally important"
strategic missions that must be performed, these
developments make much more sense. The Soviets believe that
9Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 , p.
16-17.
10Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 , p.
59-60.
8
strategic offense and defense must be simultaneously
executed in modern warfare in order to achieve its
strategic goals. 11
C . SURVIVABILITY
In considering both the United State's and Soviet
Union's command and control structures for controlling
nuclear forces, it is apparent that both are deeply
concerned with their ability to maintain a robust system
capable of surviving a dedicated nuclear attack and
continuing the fight for a period of days, weeks, and
possibly months. The Soviet Union has made tremendous
progress in this area, as seen in their reliance on
leadership bunkers, communication technigues, and in wargame
scenarios where communication breakdowns are part of the
exercise. The United States, on the other hand, has only
recently begun to appreciate the value of being able to
support the C 3 requirements necessary for a protracted
nuclear conflict. Started during the Carter administration,
the drive toward attaining the command and control
facilities capable of waging this type of conflict has been
continued by the Reagan Administration.
Although much has been done to reduce and eliminate the
command and control system vulnerabilities inherent in a
1:LJames G. Taylor, "Soviet Perspective on Military
Affairs and Deterrence," unpublished paper - (Monterey:
Naval Postgraduate School, 1989), p. 19.
nuclear conflict, the United States is still falling short
of attaining this illusive goal. The thrust of this thesis
is to discuss the C 3 I systems currently in use by the
United States and Soviet Union, the nuclear effects and
technical considerations impacting a command and control
system, a net assessment of where the United States and
Soviet Union systems* stand in achieving this goal, and a
set of recommendations listing what the United State still
requires to fully attain this capability. If the United
States achieves this ability, it will then have the option
to negotiate a termination to the conflict and possibly
arrange for the reconstitution of the government and
society.
10
II. UNITED STATES' AND SOVIET
UNION COMMAND AND CONTROL
The importance of command and control is not lost on
either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both realize
it is a critical facet of their ability to execute combat
operations, including a nuclear strike. As stated by
Esposito and Schear:
Of all the factors shaping East-West strategic relations
in the 1980' s, none is potentially more important than
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C 3 I)
.
The sensors, communications systems, operational
procedures, and command organizations that comprise, in
effect, the central nervous systems of the U.S. and
Soviet defense establishments play a critical role in
security: they determine the responsiveness of nuclear
forces to each other—and to their respective national
authorities— in peacetime, in crises, and in conflict. 12
It is this fact that will be addressed in this chapter and
chapters III and IV.
A. U.S. STRATEGIC C3 DEVELOPMENT
The requirement and concept for an integrated and
robust command and control system began with the decision in
the late 1940' s to continue production of more atomic
weapons for military use. With the advent of the Atomic
Energy Commission in 1946, President Truman was able to
maintain tight control over the warheads. In the event of a
12 Lori Esposito and James A. Schear, The Command and
Control of Nuclear Weapons (Queenstown: The Aspen
Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1985), p. 1.
11
military crisis where possible use of nuclear weapons was
foreseen, the Commission would turn the warheads over to the
military for mating to appropriate delivery vehicles. 13
This decision to maintain a direct and responsive political
link between political requirements and military action has
continued to provide the United States with a strategic
decisionmaking process requiring effective and efficient
flow of communications.
With the explosion of a nuclear bomb by the Soviet
Union on August 29, 1949, the Cold War and the nuclear arms
race began in earnest. As the Soviets increased their
capability to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, the time
line necessary for providing an adequate defense of Europe
began to shrink. It became apparent that the U.S. military
would require direct access to the nations' stockpile of
nuclear weapons in order to employ them in the defense of
the country and its interests. This policy change was
implemented in 1951 when the military first began receiving
weapons. By 1956, the weapons were turned directly over to
the military both within the United States and at overseas
bases. 14
Throughout this time period and until the early 1960 's,
the strategic C 3 system did not require much flexibility.
13 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear
Forces (New Haven: Yale University, 1983), p. 180.
14 Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces ,
p. 181-182.
12
Since nuclear weapons could only be delivered via the
bomber force, and the nuclear strategy of the time dictated
a massive response against the Soviet Union, a long time
line was inherent in the system. The United States was
shocked into action regarding the use of missile technology
when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I on October 4, 1957,
and by April 18, 1961 it had put Yuri Gagarin into space.
These two accomplishments, especially Sputnik I, made the
United States realize that the Soviet Union was quickly
developing the necessary technology base required to place
nuclear warheads on missiles and launch them at the United
States with little or no warning.
The United States was quick to respond and began
programs to build ICBM and SLBM missile systems. With their
development and deployment, the United States managed to
maintain their dominance regarding nuclear weaponry. The
changes within the command and control structure began to
undergo some revisions to accommodate this new technology
and the philosophy still in vogue, Massive Retaliation.
With the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which called
for unconstrained all-out attacks, three requirements were
laid upon the command and control structure:
1. a large nuclear force, capable of inflicting a
devastating first strike;
2. an excellent warning system, both tactical and
strategic. It must be capable of providing as much
advanced warning as possible; and
13
3. a streamlined command and control structure capable
of quickly and efficiently relaying the President's
orders to go to war. 15
The vehicle for carrying out these requirements was the
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. It
excluded the service secretaries in the combat chain of
command and designated the President and Secretary of
Defense as the National Command Authority. 16
With the development of the ballistic missile, the time
line under which a C 3 system would be required to function
became even shorter. By the mid-1960 's, it was estimated
that the NCA would have about 2 5 to 3 minutes from launch
detection to impact in which to decide on an appropriate
response. Since its inception in the 1970' s, WWMCCS has
served as a focal point for communication and information
links with the Department of Defense. With this system the
NCA was able to exercise more responsive control over
deployed U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. A more
detailed discussion covering the evolution of the system
will be covered in Chapter IV.
As the United States' nuclear forces and related
technology expanded, the nuclear doctrine of the 1960 's and
early 1970 's was centered around the philosophy of Mutual
15Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces ,
p. 183-184.
16Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control.
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 52.
14
Assured Destruction (MAD) . To support the NCA in the
decision to employ nuclear weapons, the communications
system design was centered on the ability of the equipment
to respond with little notice and accurately deliver the
Emergency Action Message (EAM) to the subordinate nuclear
commanders for action. The system had little need for
survivability since a nuclear war was expected to consist of
a single spasm attack with no thought given to a second
strike or the support of a nuclear reserve force for war
termination and negotiation. This type of policy remained
in effect until 1974 when Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
redefined the role of the U.S. nuclear forces and their
supporting command and control systems.
With National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 242,
the United States began a shift in its nuclear weapon
employment policy by specifying that Soviet command and
control facilities would be among those military
installations to be targeted in a nuclear exchange. 17 This
key shift in policy now recognized the criticality of
command and control facilities in the effective conduct of a
nuclear war.
17Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How
Viable?", Arms Control Today , 11, February 1985, p. 1-9,
and Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, FY 1978
Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and
Development: Hearing before the Committee on Armed




The concern with targeting command and control
facilities was continued during the Carter administration
with the issuance in 1980 of Presidential Directive (PD)
59. Presidential Directive 59 not only continued with the
"Schlesinger doctrine", it also reportedly added the
constituent elements of escalation control, explicit
countercommand targeting, and preparedness for protracted
war. 18 This shift is also significant, in that it specifies
the requirement for being able to conduct a protracted
nuclear exchange. This new demand on the U.S. command and
control network required a revisitation to the C 3
survivability aspects that had previously been dismissed as
unnecessary and destabilizing.
In 1982 the Reagan Administration adopted the basic
tenets set forth in PD 59 including the requirement to
develop and maintain an ability to fight a protracted
nuclear conflict. The directive addressed the issues
involved in such an undertaking including the supporting C 3
structure and equipment that would be required if the U.S.
expected to conduct a nuclear exchange over a period of
days, weeks or possibly even months. It emphasized the
communications systems needed to support reconstitution and
18Stephen J. Cimbala Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy.





execution of strategic nuclear reserve forces, specifically
full communications with ballistic missile submarines. 19
This policy has set the standard for the U.S. goal of
attaining the communication architecture and equipment
necessary to support a protracted conflict. Also, the
administration felt it needed to justify the expense
involved in putting forth the new requirement calling for
any current or planned strategic system to have a C 3 system
capable of supporting it under all conditions of use,
including nuclear war. These developments set the stage for
U.S. progress towards developing a survivable and enduring
C3 system capable of withstanding the rigors of a protracted
nuclear conflict.
B. U.S. STRATEGIC C 3 ORGANIZATION
The U.S. command structure is comprised of several
organizations which serve as the focal point for
decisionmaking in the event of a nuclear conflict. At the
NCA level, there are actually two chains of succession.
Presidential succession is provided for in the Constitution
and is in accordance with public law (Title 3, U.S. Code,
Section 19) . The order of ranking is by order of creation
of each department:
1. President
19Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Draws Up First Strategy
For Fighting a Long Nuclear War," New York Times , 30 May





Speaker of the House
4. President Pro Tempore of the Senate
5. Secretary of State
6. Secretary of the Treasury
7. Secretary of Defense
8 Attorney General
9. Secretary of the Interior
10. Secretary of Agriculture
11. Secretary of Commerce
12. Secretary of Labor
13. Secretary of Health and Human Services
14. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
15. Secretary of Transportation
16. Secretary of Energy
17. Secretary of Education20
The Secretary of Defense or his successor has the authority
to order retaliation in the event the President or his
successor could not be located:
1. Secretary of Defense
2
.
Secretary of the Army
3. Secretary of the Navy
4. Secretary of the Air Force
20Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Government Operations, Our Nation's Nuclear Warning System:
Will It Work If We Need It?: Hearing before the Committee
on Government Operations . 99th Cong., 1st sess., 26
September 1985, p. 111-112.
18
5. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
6. Undersecretary of Defense of Research and Engineering
7. Eight Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the General
Counsel to DoD
8. Undersecretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
9. Ten Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force21
To carry out the assigned missions, the NCA relies on
the Unified and Specified Commanders who have direct access
to the nation's nuclear stockpile. These commanders consist
of the Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC)
,
Commander in Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC) , Commander in
Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) , and U.S. Commander in
Chief European Command (USCINCEUR) . These commands were
established by the President under section 124, title 10,
United States Code, and given responsibility for the nuclear
combatant forces of the United States, and assigned
distinctive military missions. 22 In addition, there are
other organizations in which the U.S. has a participating
nuclear force role. These are Commander in Chief Channel
Command (CINCHAN) , Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
21 Barry R. Schneider, "Invitation to a Nuclear
Beheading," The Nuclear Reader; Strategy. Weapons, War .
eds. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1985), p. 280.
22Russell E. Dougherty, "The Psychological Climate of
Nuclear Command," Managing Nuclear Operations , eds. Ashton
B. Carter, John B. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p.
409-410.
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Commander in Chief Europe (CINCEUR) , and Commander in Chief
North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD)
.
If a nuclear attack is detected, the NCA, in consonance
with the commanders of the National Military Command Center
(NMCC) located in the Pentagon, the Alternate National
Military Command Center (ANMCC) located at Fort Ritchie,
Maryland, SAC, and NORAD will convene a threat assessment
conference to determine the validity of the attack and
determine an option to be executed for the Single Integrated
Operational Plan, called the SIOP. To carry out this
difficult and time sensitive operation, the U.S. utilizes an
integrated system of radars, communication systems, and
satellite support systems. The SIOP will be addressed in
detail in Chapter VI, and these facilities will be addressed
in detail in Chapter IV.
Under the Specified and Unified Commanders, the nuclear
forces form a triad comprised of bombers, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM's), and submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBM's). Current forces consist of
1000 ICBM's-950 Minuteman II and III and 50 Peacekeeper
missiles, 28 Poseidon and eight Trident ballistic missile
submarines, 167 B-52G, 96 B-52H, 61 FB-111 and 97 B-1B
bombers. 23
23 Department of Defense, United States Military Posture
FY 89, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 39.
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C. SOVIET TROOP CONTROL AND STRATEGIC C3 DEVELOPMENT
The Soviet Union has always endeavored to maintain a
military structure with foundations that were easily
understood and whose format was straightforward and
explicit. Their current approach to strategic command and
control has attempted to adhere to this standard. In the
broad perspective, the Soviets have attempted to integrate
the facets of political leadership, military power,
technological capability, and rigorous procedures to define
their approach to the task of controlling their nuclear
weapon forces. They view their strategic C 3 systems as one
of the keys to their victory in any protracted nuclear
conflict with the West since it will enable them to
reconstitute and carry on the fight. In this light, the
Soviet command and control process is a powerful system
that has been developed over many years incorporating the
lessons of history.
With the experiences of World War II serving as a
foundation of knowledge, the Soviet Union has attempted to
maintain a cohesive and balanced approach to the problems
of command and control. They have undergone several shifts
in their approach to the use of nuclear weapons in
conducting military policy. The first phase commenced in
1949 when the Soviet Union detonated their first nuclear
weapon. Although they realized this new weapon had enormous
power and potential, they did not foresee a viable military
21
purpose behind its use. During this first phase, lasting
from 1946 until 1953 and Stalin's death, the Soviets
denegrated the significance of nuclear weapons.
With the ascendency of Nikita Khrushchev to power, the
Soviet Union ushered in a second phase in nuclear weapons
doctrine. From 1953-1956 the Soviets sought to rapidly
expand their fledgling nuclear arsenal to a point where they
could go nuclear as quickly and as broadly as possible.
In the third phase from 1957-1964, the Soviets based
their defense posture on the foundation of nuclear weapons
and especially on the hopes for the rapid deployment of
strategic missiles. In 1959 the Soviets created the
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) . A "revolution in military
affairs" was said to have occurred and commencing in 1965,
the Soviet Union began a fourth phase by embracing a
warfighting posture capable of supporting conventional and
strategic forces in an all-out nuclear warfighting
scenario. 24 This phase also adopted, for the first time,
the possibility of fighting a protracted conflict in a
nuclear environment. With this new Soviet doctrine, a
requirement for survivable and enduring command and control
systems allowing for continuing control of nuclear forces
became a key factor in maintaining a warfighting
capability.
24Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet




In the fifth and most current phase, the Soviet Union
still postulates a conflict involving conventional and
nuclear means. Realizing that an all-out nuclear exchange
would leave the United States and the Soviet Union
devastated, it has again invested in bolstering
conventional forces while also modernizing their strategic
nuclear force and the supporting command and control
stucture. 25 As part of their modernization effort, they
have placed considerable effort towards protecting the
political and military leadership.
As the Soviet Union continues its nuclear force
modernization efforts, it is also upgrading the supporting
command and control architecture and systems to support the
doctrine they espouse. The strong desire to maintain
political control of the nuclear weapons command and
control process still exists today. The latest policies
reflect three significant aspects that should be considered
when interpreting the latest doctrine:
1. the CPSU s preeminent role in the formulation of
military doctrine is still emphasized
2. the Soviet have consistently made it clear that Soviet
military doctrine is time limited and that nothing is
immutable in military affairs, and
3. military doctrine in the Soviet perspective represents
essentially a set of guidelines for force development.
In the event of a war, military doctrine is expected
25Laird and Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic
Arms , p. 9
.
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to recede, giving way to the dictates of military
strategy. 26
The current trend toward more integrated and combined force
operations reflects this policy.
The critical nature of command and control has not been
lost on the Soviet Union in its planning for nuclear war.
In 1967 Marshall of the Soviet Union, V.D. Sokolovoskiy,
wrote that in order to incapacitate the enemy, "a
simultaneous rocket strike against the vital centers and
means of armed combat of an enemy country is the quickest
and most reliable way of achieving victory in modern war". 27
Destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains one of
their top priorities. The target base for disruption of the
enemy's capability for attack includes a myriad of
important sites and installations. According to the
previous commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Marshall
M. Krylov, the principal targets of the SRF would be the
enemy's delivery systems, weapons storage and fabrication
sites, military installations, military industries, and
center of politico-military adminstration, command and
26Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, "A 'New'
Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications,"
Strategic Review (Summer 1988): p. 10-11.
27 V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy , ed.





control. 28 In summary the essense of current Soviet
concepts are outlined below:
1. Soviets appreciate scope of devastation in the event a
nuclear war occurred.
2. Soviets seek to deter a nuclear war by two means:
a. political
—
promote relaxation of tensions, and
b. military—develop means of militarily
defeating any adversary.
3. Should deterrence fail, Soviets will seek to limit




c. strategic defense, and
d. conventional counterstrikes.
4. Soviets place a high priority on limiting damage, and
the ability to preempt places a high demand on C 3 I
systems
.
D. SOVIET STRATEGIC C2 ORGANIZATION
The critical nature of command and control has become so
ingrained into the Soviet Union's policies and doctrine for
a nuclear conflict that it now considers destruction of the
United States' nuclear arsenal and its supporting command
and control facilities among one of its top priorities.
Utilizing an effective C 3 I system, a preemptive attack would
depend on effective coordination of Soviet strike
28Marshall N. Krylov, Nedeliia (Week), no. 36
(September 1967) , cited in William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear
Targeting Strategy," in Strategic Nuclear Targeting , eds.
Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986), p. 86.
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capabilities and accurate intelligence of enemy
intentions. 29 According to Ball:
Command-and-control systems are inherently relatively
vulnerable, and concerted attacks on them would very
rapidly destroy them, or at least render them
inoperable. Despite the increased resources that the
U.S. is currently devoting to improving the
survivability and endurance of command-and-control
systems, the extent of their relative vulnerability
remains enormous. The Soviet Union would need to expend
thousands of warheads in any comprehensive counterforce
attacks against U.S. ICBM silo, bomber bases and FBM
submarine facilities, and even then hundreds if not
thousands of U.S. warheads would still survive. On the
other hand, if would require only about 50-100 warheads
to destroy the fixed facilities of the national command
system or to effectively impair the communication links
between the National Command Authorities and the
strategic forces. 30
The Soviet Union has a very extensive network of C 3 I
systems for its strategic nuclear forces. The principal
components of this system are:
1. the Soviet national command authorities (NCA)
2
.
the network of early warning and attack assessment
systems, and
3. the systems for communicating early warning and attack
assessment intelligence to the Soviet NCA and for
communicating attack commands from them to the
strategic forces. 31
29Daniel J. Marcus, "Soviet Power Today," Signal 41,
no. 4 (December 1986), p. 23.
30Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?,"
Adelohi Papers Number One Hundred and Sixty-Nine (London:




31Desmond Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," C3I
Handbook
. 1st ed., ed. Defense Electronics (Palo Alto: EW
Communications, Inc., 1986), p. 206.
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To provide a focal point for this type of strategic
decisionmaking, the Soviets are expected to implement the
framework of a highly successful planning and execution
organization utilized in World War II--the General
Headquarters (Stavka) of the Supreme High Command,
Verkhovnaye Glavnokomandovaniye or VGK. The Stavka is the
highest leadership body for the armed forces in wartime.
It is responsible for planning strategic operations, as well
as nuclear operations, and overseeing the wartime
development of the armed forces. 32
The leadership of the Soviet Armed Forces is vested in
the Politburo and the Defense Council. Under the Defense
Council, direct control and administration of the daily
activities of the armed forces is entrusted to the Ministry
of Defense. Party control of the armed forces is assured by
its decisionmaking power, its control over personnel
appointments, and by the KGB's Third Chief Directorate. 33
Also, within the Ministry of Defense are the three first
deputy defense ministers and the eleven deputy ministers.
Five of the eleven deputy ministers are Commanders in
Chief (CINC's) of the five services - Strategic Rocket
Forces, Ground Forces, Navy, Air Defense Forces, and Air
32 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 16.
33 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 , p.
13.
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Force. The five service CINC's are responsible for
peacetime force administration, management, and training.
The remaining six deputy defense ministers oversee civil
defense, rear services, the main inspectorate, construction
and billeting, personnel, and armaments. 34
Within the Ministry of Defense, the Soviet armed forces
are controlled by the General Staff. This staff conducts
peacetime and wartime force management and control . Under
the General Staff are the sixteen Military Districts which
comprise the highest military-administrative level of
military units, training institutions, military
establishments of the various Services, and local military
registration disposed within a particular area. 35 These
peacetime Military Districts do not turn into fronts in a
conflict, but rather, the command and staff functions of a
front are very likely to be already "embedded" in the
headquarters of the Military Districts and the various
Groups of Forces. 36
Also subsumed within the General Staff's areas on
control are the five Theaters of Military Operations
34 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988
. p.
13.
35John Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control; The Role of
Command Technology in the Soviet Military System (New York:
Brassey's Publisher Limited, 1982), p. 254.
36John G. Hines and Phillip A Petersen, "Changing the
Soviet System of Control," International Defense Review 9,
no. 3. (March 1986): p. 287.
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(TVD's). The TVD ' s are geographical entities in which a
High Command of Forces (HCOF) is placed. They are the
theaters in which the main strategic groupings of
belligerent powers are deployed and operating, both as a
result of an emerging international arrangement of forces
and by virtue of prevailing economic, military, political,
and geographic conditions. The main military-political and
strategic goals in the armed conflict are attained in the
main theater of military operations. 37
There are currently five TVD's, four of which are
permanent regional high commands (denoted by (*)):
1. Northwestern TVD (*)
2. Western TVD (*)
3. Southwestern TVD (*)
4. Southern TVD (*), and the
5. Far East TVD. 38
In a time of crisis or conflict, the TVD commander will have
responsibility for several fronts, and, using forces
generated by the military districts under him, will direct
their actions. 39 Figure 2-1 shows the Soviet wartime
command and TVD structure.
37Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control , p. 268.
38 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 , p.
13-15.
39Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott. The Soviet
Control Structure: Capabilities for Wartime Survival (New
York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1983), p.
70.
29
This command organization, from the General Secretary
down to the TVD commanders, is designed to provide the
Soviets with the much required flexibility when fighting a
nuclear war. The overriding priority to maintain political
control of nuclear weapons and their release criteria are
strictly maintained and the Soviet NCA has at its disposal
the broad spectrum of information from which to support and
decide on a course of action. Figure 2-2 provides a

























































The Soviet wartime coalilionnl command structure. Note: Shaded areas indicate those
commands that include East European forces.
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The United States and the Soviet Union have each
established and developed a unique command and control
31
system that fully integrates those political and military
features required for effective nuclear weapons control.
Both nations have strict guidelines to be followed in the
event of a nuclear confrontation. The United States plans
to follow well-established and publicized lines of authority
and succession in the chains of command. There is a
distinct dividing line between the political and military
portions of the nuclear equation whereas in the Soviet
Union, that dividing line is not so easily defined. The
goals of the Soviet Union lie in its desire to eventually
achieve world domination. The ties and supports between the
military and political organizations is much closer than in
the U.S. Consequently, in the event of a crisis that
threatens the fabric of the Soviet Union, the military
would most likely play a much more decisive and politically
active role.
With both nations, the C 3 structure required to support
the doctrines calling for a protracted nuclear exchange is
challenging and has been approached in different ways. To a
much greater extent than the United States, the Soviet Union
has sought to integrate strategic offense and defense in its
military strategy and have accordingly integrated the
various strategic systems. To this end, the Soviets have
invested heavily for many years in leadership and military
survival facilities whereas the United States has only
recently placed a heightened interest on those types of
32
systems capable of supporting sustained nuclear operations.
The specific systems for each nation will be addressed in
Chapters III and IV.
The concern now facing the United States is the fact
that the Soviets have commenced on a modernization program
for their strategic forces, including the C 3 I systems, to
allow them to achieve an authoritative lead in integrated
and automated systems. 40 Technologically, the United States
will probably maintain superiority, but the Soviet Union has
the rigorous command structure and control procedures in
place and is working diligently to fill in the gaps where
they are lacking. Both countries possess formidable command
and control structures, but like any large system, their
ability to adapt to the strains of a nuclear conflict remain
to be seen.
40Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 , p.
8-17.
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III. U.S. COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 1 provides
the following definition of command and control:
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the
accomplishment of the mission. Command and control
functions are performed through an arrangement of
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 41
This statement is supposed to be the guiding principle for
United States' command and control functions. To support
this statement in a strategic sense, the United States has
developed a vast network of warning and intelligence
equipment and procedures. This system is designed to
provide the NCA with the support required for control of
military forces.
In this chapter, the functions of the components which
comprise the strategic command and control system will be
addressed. These systems include the World Wide Military
Command Control System (WWMCCS) , the warning and attack
assessment systems, the command and control facilities, and
the communications equipment in use. The end goal of the
system is to support the NCA in the execution of the Single
4
-'Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms, Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984),
p. 76-77.
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Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) . For execution of the
SIOP as well as other time sensititve operations, the chain
of command is from the NCA through the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs to the commanders of the forces. 42
A. C3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND PROCEDURES
As previously mentioned, the NCA is comprised of the
President and Secretary of Defense and their respective
chains of succession. The National Military Command System
(NMCS) provides the required connectivity between the NCA,
Joint Chiefs, and the various CINC's. Before breaking
WWMCCS into its components, the subject of predelegated
authority and preplanned responses should be mentioned
since they can perform a vital function in support of
national strategy.
The planning for delegation of authority and the
issuance of preplanned response options in the event of a
nuclear conflict is essential to ensuring the survival of
the United States. Through continuity of government and
appropriate military actions the United States should be
able to sustain a warfighting effort in a protracted war.
The command and control structure currently supporting this
42 Department of Defense, Department of Defense
Directive 5100.30, World-wide Military Command and Control
System ( WWMCCS) (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense,
December 2, 1971), p. 1-2, as cited in Albert E. Babbitt,
"Command Centers," Managing Nuclear Operations , eds. Ashton
B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, Charles A. Zraket
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p.
322-323.
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doctrine is comprised of many facets, some of which are
undergoing significant changes and upgrades as a result of
PD 59 and NSDD 13 which called for strengthening C 3 I
facilities and hardware.
Although the Constitution clearly states that Congress
is responsible for declaring war, the requirement in the
nuclear age calling for predelegation of authority, from a
president to a military commander, ordering the use of
nuclear weapons, naturally raises some very sensitive
Constitutional issues as well as concerns about how to
effectively integrate a control mechanism for nuclear
weapons into a democratic form of government. 43 Hopefully,
the predelegation of basic authority to order the use of
nuclear weapons facilitates the exercise of positive
control in the event of NCA or NMCS incapacitation. This
action will presumably weaken the enemy's motivation to
attack the U.S. in the first place, thereby contributing to
deterrence. 44
In support of strategic nuclear missions and to aid in
the direct Presidential control of nuclear weapons, the
United States employs a C 3 system with three distinct areas
of responsibility:
43 Paul Bracken, The Command and Control of Nuclear
Forces (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), p. 200.
44 Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control.
Redefining the Nuclear Threat . (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 113.
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1. warning and intelligence assessment
2. command and control capability
3. communications systems
Together, these three areas combine to form the WWMCCS
.
Although WWMCCS took shape nearly 2 years ago, it has only
recently begun to synthesize the piecemeal combination of
systems that formed the basis of the United States'
deterrent nuclear posture. Today, the systems that comprise
WWMCCS and the WWMCCS Information system (WIS) are in an
evolutionary maturation process as new technology is applied
in an effort to meet the "survivable and endurable"
requirement established for them.
B. WWMCCS/WIS
Created in 1971 by Department of Defense Directive
5100.30, today, WWMCCS is a combination of about 60
communications systems and 30 command centers dispersed
worldwide. The system is designed to link key government
and military decision makers with the nation's defense
structure. It is the backbone of the NCA and strategic
forces' connectivity. The system is capable of
transmitting and receiving voice, data and video, and
during a nuclear conflict, would provide the NCA with the
37
required information and communications capability to allow
proper execution of the SIOP. 45
Because of the critical nature of the missions
involved, the system has been designed to provide as much
real time information as possible. Keeping pace with
technology advances and with the demands placed on it,
which have increased in both quantity and complexity, the
creation of the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) came about
to standardize the processing of data. 46
The system of WWMCCS is intended to support four basic
functional categories of higher echelon military command
and control. These categories, or functional families,
were defined by a concept of operations and general
requirements for post-1985 as:
1. Nuclear planning and execution (NPE)
2. Threat warning and attack assessment (TW/AA)
3. Resource and unit monitoring (RUM), and
4. Conventional planning and execution (CPE)
Although all four categories comprise WWMCCS, improvements
sought to the automated data component of WIS do not extend
to the NPE and TW/AA categories. 47
45Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 1st ed. , ed.





46Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 1st ed.
,
p. 122.
47Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 2d ed. , ed.





NPE is evolving along two significant programmatic
lines. One is the automated data processing (ADP) portion,
and the second is the engineering of what was called the
minimum essential emergency communications network. The
TW/AA portion is responsible for monitoring three types of
strategic threats against the United States: missile
attacks, attacks by atmospheric threats such as bombers and
cruise missiles, and, lastly, threats against U.S. space
assets such as communications and sensor satellites. 48
Although still in an evolutionary process, WWMCCS is
becoming a component of WIS. With the emphasis on joint
service ventures being stressed, the system is being
continually adapted to various needs. However,
technological challenges such as multi-level security, data
standardization, and the use of local area networks (LAN's)
are hampering the integration of the process. 49 As the
system becomes more streamlined, it will continue to
provide the NCA and strategic forces with a viable command
and control network capable of both peacetime, crisis, and
wartime operations.
C. WARNING AND INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
The main purpose of warning and intelligence assessment
facilities and equipment is to provide a means of gauging
48 Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 2d ed., p. 56.




and determining the validity of a nuclear strike against
the United States. The system consists of dedicated and
adapted satellites and a variety of radar facilities
providing coverage over different areas and threats. The
various systems are described below:
1. Satellite Systems
a. Satellite Early Warning System (SEWS)
The SEWS is designed to provide tactical
warning of a ballistic missile attack by using infrared
sensing of missile exhaust gases. It consists of three
satellites positioned in a geosynchronous orbit over the
Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans. Coverage extends
from 81° north and south and across 162° of longitude.
Besides providing attack confirmation, these satellites can
also provide critical information about the nature and size
of the attack, allowing for an appropriate response. 50
Warning information is transmitted from the satellite to
various ground stations which relay the information to SAC,
NMCC, and NORAD for evaluation. 51 Figure 1 shows
approximate satellite positions. 52
50 Paul B. Stares, "Nuclear Operations and
Antisatellites, " Managing Nuclear Operations , p. 681-685.
51Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces , p.
36.
52 Stares, "Nuclear Operations and Antisatellites," p. 685.
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Figure 3-1. Approximate SEWS Earth Coverage 53
b. Navigation Satellite Timing and Ranging
(NAVSTAR)
NAVSTAR global positioning system (GPS) is a
space-based radio navigation system designed to allow users
to passively receive precise position, velocity, and time
information anywhere on or above the earth's surface. It is
accurate in distance to within 16 meters spherical error
probable, velocity 0.10 meters per second, and time within
100 nanoseconds. It utilizes spread spectrum signals of
1575.2 MHz and 1227.6 MHz modulated onto a carrier frequency
of 10.23 Mbps. System design has incorporated several
53Anthony Kenden, "U.S. Military Satellites, 1983,"
Journal of the British Interplanetary Society 38, February
1985, p. 63.
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survival mechanisms including 18 satellites in operation
with three backup satellites in orbit, physical hardening
against antisatellite weapons, sabotage or jamming attacks
on the control facilities, and jamming or electromagnetic
pulse disruption of the user equipment. 54
c. Nuclear Detection System (NDS)
The NDS is deployed as a supplementary package
onboard the NAVSTAR GPS system, NDS is designed to detect
the flash, X-rays, and electromagnetic pulse from nuclear
explosions anywhere in the world. Initial operational
capability is anticipated to begin in 1991, and it will be
capable of determining weapons yield and having an accuracy
to within 100 meters. Data from NDS will be transmitted to
all principal command centers, both fixed and airborne. 55
In the context of a protracted nuclear conflict, NDS will
be the primary source of information capable of providing
the NCA with postattack assessments and follow-on attack
planning. 56
d. Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP)
Consisting of two satellites in near-polar
orbits, each one is capable of viewing the entire earth's




55Stares, "Nuclear Operations and Antisatellites, " p. 690.
56 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriation for
Fiscal Year 1983: Hearing before the Committee on Armed
Services
. 97th Cong., 2d sess., 16 March 1982, p. 4624-4625.
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surface in twelve hours. System is designed to provide
meteorological data in support of military operations and
utilized visual and infrared sensors to determine weather
patterns and storm information. An infrared temperature
and moisture sounder and a microwave temperature sounder is
also used to allow forecasters to plot curves of
atmospheric temperature and water vapor as a function of
altitude. To determine the effect of the aurora on
communications and radar systems operating in the northern
latitudes, it is also equipped with a precipitating
electron spectrometer. Current survivability enhancements
include hardening against laser radiation and
electromagnetic pulse. 57 Additionally, data provided by
meteorological satellites has a direct application to
missile targeting, since the accuracy of ballistic missiles
is greatly affected by prevailing wind conditions and the
moisture-content of clouds. 58
e. Reconnaissance and Surveillance Satellites
These satellite systems provide a variety of
critical information related to electronic intelligence
(ELINT) , communications intelligence (COMINT) signal




58 Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled,"
Adelphi Papers Number One Hundred and Sixty-Nine (London:





intelligence (SIGINT) , radar imaging intelligence, and
photo-reconnaissance intelligence. Together these systems
form the basis of our technical intelligence (TECHINT)
resources. 59 These systems all combine to support three
key roles in supporting national security: (1) provide
information on foreign weapons, industrial productivity,
agricultural output, and the status of forces related to
their defense posture; (2) monitors the military forces
and their readiness postures, thereby decreasing the
possibility of a surprise attack and contributing to
escalation control; and (3) provides data pertaining to
verification of arms control agreements and the adherence
to its provisions. 60 Stemming in part from the second
role, the possibility exists for using these systems to
provide post-attack damage assessment and status of the
enemies reconstituted forces should they survive a nuclear
conflict.
2 . Radar Systems
a. North Warning System (NWS)
The NWS is an evolutionary system; it was
originally started as the Pinetree Line then the Distance
Early Warning (DEW) Line. Currently in the process of
upgrades starting in 1986, the system will be completely
59William E. Burrows, Deep Black; Space Espionage and
National Security (New York: Random House, 1986), p. 17-24.
60Burrows, Deep Black , p. 1-7.
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operational by 1992. The system is designed to have
thirteen large attended radars interspersed with thirty-
nine short-range unattended "gap fillers" across northern
Alaska and Canada. 61 It provides SAC and NORAD with timely
tactical warning of an impending Soviet air-breather
attack. Survivability enhancements include massive use of
solid-state electronics as well as sophisticated
communications links and automated computerized control. 62
(Fig. 3-2)
b. Over The Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B)
The OTH-B radar system will become the principal
ground based atmospheric surveillance sensor. It is
designed to provide long range detection and early warning
of manned bomber, air-to-surface missile and cruise missile
attack against the continental United States. Operating at
5 to 28 MHz, it has 100 megawatts of radiated power. Beam-
width is 7.5° and can be electronically "steered" to radiate
desired areas of coverage. It operates by transmitting high
freguency (HF) signals and bouncing them off the ionosphere.
The system's receive antenna arrays pick up the re-refracted
signal (backscatter) and through signal processing; the
desired target echoes are separated from the clutter of land
and sea returns and are displayed. Four areas of coverage
61John C. Toomay, "Warning and Assessment Sensors,"
Managing Nuclear Operations , p. 292-293.
62Toomay, "Warning and Assessment Sensors," p. 293.
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are planned in twelve sectors. The three east coast sectors
are completed with the west coast, Alaskan, and gulf port
sectors scheduled to be in operation in the late 1980 's and
early 1990' s. Due to effects by aurora borealis
interference, the system is ineffective toward the north,
hence the requirement for the North Warning System. (Fig.
3-2)
Source: "USAF Hones Air Defense Capabilities," Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 120 (March 19. 1984),
p. 85.
Figure 3-2 Planned Atmospheric Coverage of the United
States and Canada, Showing Over The Horizon
Backscatter (OTH-B) Coverage Sectors and North
Warning System (NWS)
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c. Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
The BMEW system is designed to provide warning
of an ICBM attack from the Soviet Union or China.
Consisting of three sites with varying degrees of coverage,
they are located at Clear, Alaska with 170° azimuthal
coverage, Thule, Greenland with 200° coverage, and
Fylingdales, England with 180° coverage. It is capable of
detection ranges of 4 000 km on a target of 0.1 m 2 radar
cross section; however, resolution between a group of
closely spaced weapons is poor, and they cannot
differentiate between them. It is also not accurate enough
to project target impact points or pinpoint launch locations
in a useful manner. Future plans call for upgrading the
facilites by replacing them with PAVE PAWS radars. 63 (Fig.
3-3)
d. Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System (PARCS)
The PARCS radar was originally part of the
Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, and is the
only component of the system still in service. It is a
large phased array radar whose purpose is to provide
accurate assessment of inbound reentry vehicles to the ICBM
fields in the central United States. PARCS is capable of
providing a raid count, an impact profile, and a target
class summary (number of weapons expected to land on cities,
63 Toomay, "Warning and Assessment Sensors," p. 293-296.
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missile fields, bomber or tanker fields, command and control
centers, and Washington, D.C.) 64 (Fig. 3-2)
I TARCS; 2 BMEWS, Clear. Alaska, 3 BMEWS. Thule, Greenland. 4 BMEWS. Fyltngdales. Engbnd.
5. TAVE PAWS. Beale AFB. California; ft PAVE PAWS. Goodfellow AFB. Teias; 7 PAVE PAWS. Cape Cod AFS,
Massachusetts, 8 PAVE PAWS Robins AFB, Georgia Figure shows 1,000-km ahitude deleclion conlourx
Figure 3-3. Missile Warning Radar Coverage, 1990'
s
64Aviation Week and Space Technology, "Improved U.S.
Warning Net Spurred," Aviation Week and Space Technology
112, no. 25, June 23, 1980, p. 38, 44.
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e. Perimeter Acquisition of Vehicle Entry Phased-
Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS)
These facilities consist of four large phased
array radar facilities located at Cape Cod Air Force Station
in Massachusetts; Beale Air Force Base, California; Robins
Air Force Base, Georgia; and Goodfellow Air Force Base,
Texas. 65 They are designed to detect and track SLBM
attacks. Upgrades in power and data processing capability
are in progress to give them greater tracking capacity and
the discrimination necessary for accurately counting MIRV's
and predicting their impacts. They replaced the older FSS-7
and FPS-85 radars. 66 (Fig. 3-3)
f. Cobra Dane
Cobra Dane is a large ground-based radar on
Shemya Island, Alaska. It became operational in 1977 for
the purpose of monitoring Soviet tests of MIRV's. It can
track dozens of targets simultaneously and provide
information on the size and shape of reentry vehicles
launched in the Soviet Pacific Ocean test range. 67
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY
In order to effectively conduct a nuclear exchange,
especially a protracted conflict, the NCA must have the
capability of receiving accurate and timely processed
65Toomay, "Warning and Assessment Sensors," p. 306.
66Blair, Strategic Command and Control , p. 224.
67 Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces , p. 37
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information, making a decision on a response, and issuing
the necessary orders to have it carried out. The mechanism
to support this requirement is based on a number of fixed
and airborne command posts. Currently, the National
Military Command System (NMCS) has three command centers:
the National Military Command Center (NMCC) , its alternate,
and an airborne command post. Each is capable of executing
SIOP options and maintaining direct connectivity with the
JCS and the CINC's. Additionally, the individual CINC's
have their own airborne command posts for maintaining a
link to ensure direct control over assigned nuclear forces.
The details of each facility are addressed below.
1. Fixed-Site Facilities
a. National Military Command Center (NMCC)
Located in the Pentagon, it is designed to
provide the NCA with the capability to assemble the
commanders of the NMCC, ANMCC, SAC, and NORAD together in
the event of a nuclear conflict or national emergency. It
has the facilities for intelligence activities,
conferencing, logistics support, computers, programming
support, and vital communications equipment. It also
contains back-up primary power, consumables, and life-
support equipment. It is a soft target since there has
been no attempt to harden it. 68
68 Babbitt, "Command Centers," p. 323, 336-337.
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b. Alternate National Military Command Center
(ANMCC)
The ANMCC is the back-up facility to the NMCC
and is located underground at Ft. Ritchie, Maryland. The
facility receives the same warning and intelligence data as
NMCC. It can also effect a smooth transition of power
to/from the NMCC and NEACP. 69 The facility was rated as
"moderately hard" but recently downgraded due to increased
Soviet ICBM and SLBM accuracy and yield. 70
c. Strategic Air Command (SAC) Command Post
The SAC command post is located at SAC
headquarters at Offut AFB, Nebraska. It is an underground
facility that has recently undergone significant
modernization upgrades to intelligence and warning inputs
and communications equipment. Although located underground,
it is not considered a hardened facility. It is designed to
control the strategic bomber and ICBM forces. 71
d. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
Located in Cheyenne Mountain outside Colorado
Springs, Colorado, it is a separate organization from SAC.
It is operated in conjunction with the Canadian Defense
Force (CDF) and is tied into the resources provided to NMCC,
69 Blair, Strategic Command and Control , p. 108-109.
70Blair, Strategic Command and Control , p. 108-109, 139.
71Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces , p.
186-188.
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ANMCC, and SAC. It is a hardened facility but cannot
withstand a dedicated attack.
e. CINCPAC, CINCLANT, CINCEUR Headquarters
These command centers are located in Honolulu,
Hawaii, Norfolk, Virginia, and Stuttgart, Germany
respectively. They are designed to control the nuclear
forces within their theaters, including SSBN's. Facilities
are above ground and are not hardened. 72
f. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
The FEMA is responsible for coodinating civil
emergency preparedness for nuclear attack, planning to
ensure continuity of government and coordinating
mobilization of resources during national security
emergencies. 73 To support these activities, FEMA maintains
a national underground command center, the Alternate
Emergency Information and Coordinating Center, and ten
regional centers. At least six of these are underground. 74
2. Mobile Sites
a. National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP)
72 N.L. Flacco, "Command and Control Survivability:
Has The Reagan Administration Given Up?, 11 unpub. paper
(Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1987), p. 12.
73 Federal Emergency Management Agency, This Is The
Federal Emergency Management Agency , (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 2.
74Robert G. Leahy, The Mechanisms of War Termination ,
(Washington, D.C. : Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,




Now located at Grissom Air Force Base, Indiana,
it is a modified Boeing 747, designated an E-4B, that has
been EMP hardened from the design stage. It too has the
same capabilities as the NMCC and ANMCC and can be scrambled
and prestaged as necessary for the President and his staff
in the event of a crisis. It is considered the most
survivable of the command and control platforms and
facilities. CINCPAC and CINCLANT have the same specially
fitted aircraft available to them and can scramble them as
































Figure 3-4. National Emergency Airborne Command Post
75 Blair, Strategic Command and Control , p. 189.
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b. Looking Glass
Looking Glass is a modified Boeing 707,
designated an EC-135, that serves as the alternate command
post for SAC. There has been aircraft airborne since the
program's inception February 3, 1961. It is designed to
carry out the same functions as SAC in a nuclear conflict.
E. COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
Considered by many to be "the tie that binds",
communications and data processing is a fundamental
underpinning for effective command and control. Although
C 3 I has received great emphasis in recent years, it has
been communications eguipment and systems that have
received the majority of emphasis and funding priorities.
The special problems posed by the requirement of enduring
and survivable communications has posed special technical
problems that have required extensive rethinking of
communications architecture and design, especially in the
areas of physical hardening, EMP hardening, and the ability
to operate in a damaged or degraded state. Despite
budgetary constraints, communications upgrades to WWMCCS are
expected to continue dependent on the availability of launch
vehicles and the requirement to maintain communications
capability at the present level. The three types of
systems-ground based, air based, and satellites—currently
in use and those expected to become operational within the
next few years are addressed below:
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1 . Ground Based
a. Primary Alerting System (PAS)
PAS is a dedicated landline circuit, which has
been upgraded with additional cable and microwaves. It
serves as the primary means of strategic voice
communications for SAC and runs from SAC to the numbered
Air Force headquarters in the United States, the Minuteman
and Peacekeeper Launch Control Centers (LCC's), wing command
posts at primary SAC bomber bases, and other units at home
and abroad. 76
b. Scope Signal
Scope Signal is an HF communications system
that replaces Giant Talk. It is tasked with providing
connectivity between SAC headquarters and SAC ' s globally
deployed forces. It consists of three stations within the
U.S. and six overseas stations. The three stations within
the U.S. will be capable of "seizing" all stations located
worldwide within 30 seconds. EAM's can then be transmitted
by the NCA to all SAC airborne forces. 77
c. Green Pine
The Green Pine system is a group of forward
area UHF ground radio stations located on an arc between
Alaska's Aleutian Islands and Iceland. Its purpose is to
communicate with bombers enroute to their targets.
76Blair, Strategic Command and Control . p. 54-55, 103.




d. Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN)
GWEN is a strategic communications system
operating over the low frequency (LF) groundwave (150-175
KHz) band. E-4B and EC-135 aircraft will be equipped with
GWEN terminals linking them with the system. 78 The system
has completed initial operational testing and will become
fully operational with a 56-node network by the end of 1989.
There are 4 more nodes scheduled to be built to give remote
SAC bases connectivity. The full system should be
operational by 1993. 79 (Fig. 3-5)
e. Very Low Frequency (VLF) System
The VLF communications systems are used to
communicate with U.S. submarine forces at sea. The range of
this system is reputed to be about 10,000 km. The antenna
sights are operated by the U.S. Navy and have been located
throughout the U.S. and abroad. The submarine message
broadcast system is sent utilizing this system. In order
for submarines to copy it they must trail a long wire behind
the submarine for good reception, and, although water
penetration is possible, it is only for a few meters. VLF
is somewhat difficult to operate it is considered excellent
for operation in a nuclear environment due to its relative
78 Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook , 1st ed.
,
p. 85.
79 Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of
Defense to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial
Budget and FY 1990-1994 Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 192.
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Figure 3-5. Ground Wave Emergency Network (GWEN) Thin-Line
System
f. Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) System
The system originally planned, called Sanguine,
was designed to transmit ELF signals to SSBN's at sea and
had the additional benefit of being EMP and physically
hardened to withstand a nuclear blast. As the system
evolved, however, the hardening portion fell by the wayside,
but the EMP hardening remained intact. The current system,
80Ashton B. Carter, "Communications Technologies and
Vulnerabilities, Managing Nuclear Operations , p. 236-239.
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called Seafarer, is now operational. There are two sites
located at Clam Lake, Wisconsin, and one on Michigan's Upper
Peninsula near K.I. Sawyer AFB. Radiated power is two to
eight watts, and the transmitters operate in electrical
sychronism to increase signal strength. Although the data
rate is slow, it serves as more than a "bell ringing"
system and can transmit a considerable amount of information
using Navy coding techniques and preformatted messages. 81
g. Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT)
With the high alert rates and reliable
supporting communications for the ICBM force, the REACT
programs have recently been instituted to enhance the
present system characteristics and upgrade the message-
handling capabilities and computer systems of launch
facilities. This will allow ICBM's to be retargeted rapidly
in order to strike newly emergent targets. 82
2 . Airborne Systems
a. Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS)
These selected Minuteman silos are located at
Whiteman AFB, Missiouri and house missiles equipped with a
tape recorder and a UHF radio package instead of a warhead.
It is designed to transmit an EAM with the launch
authorization provided from the NCA. The system has the
81Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 2d ed.
,
p. 79-80.
82 Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of
Defense on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget , p. 185.
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capability to receive a launch order from Looking Glass or
other LCC's, play it back to permit launch crews to check it
for accuracy and completeness, and upon launch, broadcast
the message during a flight along either a northwest or
northeast trajectory. 83
b. Post Attack Command and Control System (PACCS)
PACCS is an airborne strategic network designed
to control bomber and ICBM forces in the event its
underground command centers, alternate command, or ground-
based communications are destroyed. PACCS includes Looking
Glass, the East and West Auxiliary Command Posts, the three
Airborne Launch Control Centers and the two Radio Relay
aircraft. PACCS' mission unlike NEACP's, whose mission is
to direct the full range of U.S. strategic forces, is to
command and control SAC's nuclear assets and maintain
connectivity between these forces. 84 (Fig. 3-6)
c. Take Charge And Move Out (TACAMO)
TACAMO is a Navy airborne radio relay system that
serves as the survivable communications link between the
NCA and SSBN's on alert at sea. The aircraft is a modified
EC-130 that transmits very low frequency (VLF) signals via
a six-mile-long trailing wire antenna. It uses spread
spectrum technology and receives uplink messages from shore
118.
83 Blair, Strategic Command and Control , p. 166.
84 Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook , 1st ed., p. 117-
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stations and the E-4B NEACP aircraft. It can also line
with the AFSATCOM and FLTSATCOM systems as well as the
ERCS . Upgrades in aircraft and equipment, with the
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Figure 3-6. PACCS Airborne UHF Communications Network
d. Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT)
The system is a VLF/LF terminal which permits
bombers to receive messages in flight at much greater
distances that the UHF 1 ine-of -sight communications.
Messages can be received from airborne command posts and it
is much less susceptible to nuclear effects and jamming,




making it a key control factor in issuing orders at the
"fail-safe" point. It will reach initial operational
capability on the B-1B bombers in 1991 and should be fully
deployed on B-52H bombers by the mid-1990 • s. 86
3. Satellites
a. Fleet Satellite Communications System
(FLTSATCOM)
This satellite system provides UHF voice and
data communications among U.S. naval aircraft, ships,
submarines; strategic C 3 networks, and SAC forces. It
operates on 23 channels in the 244-400 Mhz range with one
500 KHz wideband channel reserved for use by the NCA. It is
scheduled to be replaced by MILSTAR in the 1990' s. 87
b. Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
III
The system is used to provide long-haul
communications for worldwide military command and control,
crisis management, intelligence dissemination and
administrative services. It has 23 channels: 10 for Navy
use, 12 for strategic capable forces and one wideband
channel for use by the NCA. It is jam resistant and has a
single channel transponder and two UHF antennas for use by
86Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of
Defense on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget , p. 193.




the AFSATCOM as a wartime backup C 3 system for strategic
forces. 88
c. Air Force Satellite Communications System
(AFSATCOM)
The strategic portion of the FLTSATCOM is the
AFSATSOM and is used for communications between nuclear
missile command posts, strategic bombers, and other
facilities harboring nuclear weapons. The system is fully
operational with 550 terminals in use. 89
d. Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System
(MILSTAR)
A new generation satellite system to be fielded
in the 1990* s, it will utilize EHF communications, spread
spectrum techniques, fast frequency hopping and the ability
to operate autonomously for as long as six months without
ground support. Physical as well as extensive EMP hardening
are also built in. The planned configuration calls for
eight geosychronous satellites, four in equatorial
positions, four at higher and lower latitudes for polar
coverage and one orbital spare. 90
F. SUMMARY
As shown, the command and control system which makes up
the United States 1 C 3 I system is complicated and diverse.
88Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 2d ed., p. 63-64
89 Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook . 1st ed.
,
p. 171.
90Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook , 2d ed., p. 61-62.
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No one area can stand alone and function without the
support of the others. The challenges presented by
operating a system like WWMCCS/WIS, capable of continuous
peacetime operations and quickly adapting to the harsh
standards demanded in a nuclear conflict are very
demanding. Exhibiting the qualities inherent in any
functional command and control system--f lexibility
,
redundancy, reliability, accuracy, security, etc.--
V7WMCCS/WIS provides a tool through which the NCA can carry
out required missions with strategic nuclear forces. Figure
3-7 shows a breakdown of the information flow within the































Figure 3-7. U.S. Command and Control Diagram for Control of
Strategic Nuclear Forces
63
With the commencement of the Strategic Modernization
Program under the Reagan administration, C 3 I has received a
top priority for system upgrades and enhancements. These
improvements are designed to provide the United States with
a responsive and integrated command and control structure
capable of retaliating to a nuclear stike, reorganizing and
reconstituting the remaining strategic forces and then
continuing the fight in a protracted conflict if required.
64
IV. SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL
In discussing the concepts involved in Soviet command
and control, it is apparent they are extremely concerned
with the degree of control they exercise over their society
and the military. This Soviet preoccupation pervades every
aspect of Soviet society, most especially military affairs,
in which the Soviets have perceived a major revolution to
have occurred. This revolution, which came to fruition in
the 1960 's, is composed of three relatively independent
phases:
1. the development of nuclear weapons
2. the development of long-range missiles to deliver
these nuclear weapons, and
3. the development of comprehensive automation of the
forces and means of waging war. 91
In additions to these phases, Soviet military analysts have
suggested four primary military-technological trends as also
creating the conditions for the emerging "revolutionary turn
in military affairs":
1. the accumulation, further development and qualitative
modernization of nuclear weapons
2. the rapid development of military electronics
3. the significant qualitative modernization of
conventional weapons, and
91James G. Taylor, "Cybernetic Concepts and Troop
Control," unpublished report (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate
School, 1987), p. 15.
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4. the development of weapons systems based on new
physical principles. 92
The Soviets postulate that the technologies involved in
these trends could increase the controllability of both
weapons systems and force operations. 93 In order to control
its nuclear arsenal effectively, the Soviet Union has
developed a comprehensive and integrated C 3 I structure to
support a sustained nuclear warfighting capability.
To better appreciate how the Soviets developed their
C 3 I system, it would help to know how it uses different
terms to express its definition of strategic command and
control. Soviet military writers use the expression
"command, control, and communications" only when discussing
Western forces. In discussing their own strategic
requirements, they use the terms troop control (upravleniye
voyskami) and strategic leadership (strategicheskoye
rukovodstvo)
.
94 The definitions of troop control and
strategic leadership are best summarized as follows:
1. Troop control is the constant control on the part of
commanders and staffs of all phases of activity of
subordinated troops directed toward fulfillment of
assigned missions. The basic requirements of troop
92 Phillip A. Petersen and Notra Trulock III, "A 'New'
Soviet Military Doctrine: Origins and Implications,"
Strategic Review 16, no. 3. (Summer 1988): p. 12.
93 Petersen and Trulock, "A 'New' Soviet Military
Doctrine: Origins and Implications," p. 12.
94 Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations,"
Managing Nuclear Operations , eds. Ashton B. Carter, John D.
Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 474.
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command are: continuity, firmness, flexibility, and
quickness of reaction to changes in the situation. 95
2. Strategic leadership is concerned with decisionmaking
and political oversight by the highest political
military authorities. 9 ^
By providing a rigid and distinct definition for the two
aspects of command and control, it feels it has better
defined the roles that members of the military and
political chain of authority operate under, thereby
providing a better forum for force employment and execution.
Although little information exists in hard facts about
the Soviet approach to nuclear war, current military
writings postulate three primary avenues from which a
nuclear conflict could occur:
1. escalation to global war from peacetime
2. global nuclear war arising from an extended superpower
confrontation or crisis, or
3. a nuclear escalation in the course of a major
conventional war with the West. 97
Soviet military specialists have also mentioned two other
possible scenarios:
1. an accident that precipitates nuclear war, or
2. an escalation to nuclear war from a local war
95John Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control: The Role of
Command Technology in the Soviet Military System (New York:
Brassey's Publishers Limited, 1982), p. 269.
96Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 474.
97Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 471.
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The only other nuclear war contingency that might occur,
and one which is not mentioned by the Soviets, is the
possibility of a surprise first-strike by the Soviets
intended to disarm the United States. 98
Today, the Soviet Union has a very extensive network of
C 3 I systems for supporting its strategic nuclear forces.
The principal components of this system are:
1. the Soviet national command authorities (NCA)
2. the network of early warning and attack assessment
systems, and
3. the systems for communicating early warning and attack
assessment intelligence to the Soviet NCA and for
communicating attack commands from them to the
strategic forces."
Additionally, the Soviet Union has built an extensive
network of command and control bunkers from which a war
effort could be directed. This capability will be
addressed further in Chapter VII.
A. WARNING AND ATTACK ASSESSMENT SYSTEMS
The Soviet Union maintains an extensive array of warning
systems to provide them with both strategic warning of a
nuclear attack as well as the tactical facilities to
characterize and determine the extent of an attack
underway. Currently, they rely on intelligence supplied
98Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 471.




ed. Defense Electronics (Palo Alto: EW
Communications, Inc., 1986), p. 206.
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through SIGINT, COMINT, ELINT, and photoreconnaissance
intelligence (PHOTINT) to provide strategic warning.
Warning of an inbound attack is gleaned from various radars,
including OTH-B and phased array, and satellite systems.
1. Satellite Systems
a. Infrared Detection
Similar in nature to the United States' DSP and
NDS systems, these satellites comprise a ballistic missile
launch detection network. The constellation in place now
consists of infrared telescope-carrying satellites which are
reportedly capable of providing about 30 minutes warning of
a U.S. ICBM launch and of determining the general area from
which the attack was launched. 100 This system has not
achieved the success reported in the DSP program and,
consequently, full time coverage of U.S. ICBM fields has
not been achieved. 101 (Fig 4-1)
b. Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite (RORSAT)
RORSAT is a radar imaging satellite designed to
detect, locate and target enemy naval forces. They are part
of the Soviet's strategic defensive system and comprise the
first layer of the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System (SOSS)
100Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 ,
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985),
p. 45.
101 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 210.
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Also, they are nuclear powered which gives them a much
extended service life. 102
90 120 150 180 210 2110 270 300 330 360 30
Figure 4-1. Estimated Ground Path for Soviet Early Warning
Satellite
c. Electronic Intelligence Satellites (ELINT)
The ELINT satellites comprise a system of at
least six satellites designed to operate in cooperation with
the RORSAT satellite system. This is the second portion of
the SOSS system and is called ELINT Ocean Reconnaissance
Satellite (EORSAT) . It provides worldwide coverage and
monitors the electromagnetic spectrum from ELF to UHF. Due
102Nicholas L. Johnson, "C 3 in Space: The Soviet
Approach," Soviet C3 . ed. Stephen J. Cimbala, (Washington,
D.C.: AFCEA International Press, 1987), p. 347.
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to their limited capabilities in EHF, this system is given
little credibility to operate effectively in this region. 103
A new system began to be fielded in 1984, and by 1985 a more
capable system was operational. The new system can
effectively operate with only four satellites in orbit. 104
d. GLONASS
GLONASS is a global navigation system similar
in nature to the soon-to-be-deployed U.S. NAVSTAR GPS
system. The system is capable of providing locating data
for both strategic and tactical systems; however Soviet
SSBN's would probably not rely on it too heavily since they
would reportedly be "bastioned" close to the homeland in
time of crisis or war and support could be provided by
other means. 105
e. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Although a SIGINT system has been fielded, it
reportedly lacks the sophistication of current U.S. systems.
It requires a much larger number of operational satellites
which are deployed in a configuration permitting accurate
direction finding of the source of signal transmissions.
The information provided by these systems comprise the bulk
103 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 210.
104Johnson, "C 3 in Space: The Soviet Approach," p.
347-348.
105Stares, "Nuclear Operations and Antisatellites, " p.
689.
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of Soviet strategic warning of impending U.S. preparations
for a nuclear strike. 106
2 . Radars
a. Over The Horizon Backscatter (OTH-B)
Code named "Steel Work", there are three radar
sites operational—one near Nikolayevsk-na-Amure in the
extreme eastern Soviet Union; one near Gomel, about 175
miles southeast of Minsk; and a third near Nikolayev in the
Caucasus Mountains. The first two are positioned for
detection of ICBM's launched from U.S. ICBM fields, and the
last site is trained toward Chinese ICBM fields. As with
U.S. OTH-B radars, these too are very powerful and work
within the HF spectrum. 107 The radars can be used in either
beam steering mode or wide-angle steering; and, given an
azimuth of anticipated attack, they can provide SLBM
detection as well. 108
b. Hen House
The system currently consists of nine radar
sites located on the periphery of the Soviet Union. They
confirm an attack and provide missile tracking
information. 109 There are six site locations; Sary Shagan;
106 Bracken, Command and Control of Nuclear Forces , p.
46-47.
107 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 210.
108 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 210.
109Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 .
p. 45.
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Olenogorsk (on the Kola Peninsula); Skrudna, Latvia;
Nikolayev, in the Caucasus Mountains; Angarsk (Mishelevka)
near Irkutsk; and Kamchatka. They are similar in
performance to the U.S. BMEW System with detection ranges in
the vicinity of 6000 km. 110 These radars are designed as a
secondary layer of radar confirmation to supplement
satellite and OTH-B systems and provide data on the scale of
an attack. They also provide target-tracking data in
support of the Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
program. 111 These radars will be replaced by the new phased
















Figure 4-2. Hen House Radar System Coverage
110 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 211.
111 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 ,
p. 45.
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c. Cat House and Dog House Large Phased Array
Radars (LPARS)
These radars, located south of Moscow, are
designed to provide intermediate range target-tracking
information to supplement the ABM system deployed around
Moscow. 112 The systems both operate in the VHF band around
100 MHz with a range of about 2800 km. 113 (Fig. 4-3)
d. Pill Box Large Phased Array Radars (LPARS)
This is a network of nine radars located around
the Soviet Union designed to ascertain the general
direction of an attack and provide up to 30 minutes
warning. Each building has four radar faces, giving each
facility 360° coverage. Although construction is not
expected to be complete until the mid-1990' s, the the
ability to integrate target tracking and ABM intercepts
gives them a true battle management capability. 114 Their
locations have been tentatively identified: Pushkino,
northeast of Moscow; Pechora; Lyaki, near the Caspian Sea;
Olenogorsk, on the Kola Peninsula; Sary Shagan; Mishelevka,
112 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1985 .
p. 47-48.
113 Cecil Brownlow and Barry Miller, "The Growing
Threat: Soviets Closing Gap in Avionics, Computer Science
Military Development," Aviation Week and Space Technology
95, no. 14, 25 Oct 1971, p. 40-46.
114 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 .
p. 44-45, 56-57.
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near Irkutsk; Abalakova, north of Krasnoyarsk; and on the
Kamchatka Peninsula. 115 (Fig. 4-3)
Figure 4-3. Coverage Sectors of Dog and Cat House Radars
and Pill Box Large Phased Array Radars
C. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS
The Soviets have typically relied heavily on their long
haul HF communications capability. With the vast distances
involved in maintaining connectivity across their country,
the Soviets used to placed great emphasis on this form of
115 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 211, and
Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 , p. 14-15.
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communication. Recently, however, the Soviet Union has
become very dependent on satellite communications. Starting
in the 1970' s, the Soviet Union began to field a variety of
satellite systems designed to support a worldwide
communications capability. This effort has continued today,
and, of all satellites launched, communications-related
satellites now account for the second largest portion of
launches next to photoreconnaissance satellites 116 .
Although little exact information is available
concerning their land based communications network and
operating characteristics, there are several sources
concerning satellite communications. The Soviets rely on a
three tier system of satellites located in low altitude,
highly elliptical (Molniya) , and geosynchronous orbits.
1. Satellites
a. Low Altitude
There are two sets of constellations, both
serving near real-time needs of military forces across the
Soviet Union. They are deployed in 74° inclination orbits
to permit coverage across extreme northern and southern
latitudes. 117
116Nicholas L. Johnson, Soviet Space Programs 1980-
1985 66 (San Diego: Univelt, Inc., 1987), p. 56.
117Johnson, Soviet Space Programs 1980-1985 , p. 56.
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b. Highly Elliptical (Molniya)
Two constellations of these satellites serve
Soviet communication requirements. Eight Molniya-1
satellites are flown in eight orbital planes spaced 45°
apart with each satellite tracing the same ground path over
the Earth every three hours. Four Molniya-3 satellites are
in orbital planes spaced 90° apart to reduce tracking
requirements. 118 Until recently, one of the Molniya-3
satellites served as the Soviet contribution in the Moscow-
Washington "hot line". 119 (Fig. 4-4)
Figure 4-4. Coverage Area As Observed From A Satellite In A
Molniya Orbit
118Johnson, Soviet Space Programs 1980-1985 , p. 58-59
119 Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 213.
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c. Geosynchronous
This type of orbital pattern was not fully
adopted by the Soviets until the late 1970' s and early
1980' s. This was due in part to the fact that although
these satellites have very high orbits, their coverage
cannot reach all parts of the Soviet Union at once
—
requiring additional satellites. Four systems currently
exist: Raduga, which primarily provides domestic and
international communications service in the 4-6 GHz range;
Ekran, which provides television broadcast services to
Siberia, the Far East, and Extreme North; Gorizont, which
provides television service to the western portion of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries; and the Kosmos
system which provides for other missions including test and
evaluation of new systems and equipment. 120 (Fig 4-5)
2 . Land-Sea-and Air-Based Assets
The Soviet Union currently possesses an extensive
network of HF and VHF radio, land-lines, and microwave
communications links. These systems have been the mainstay
of Soviet strategic communications for years. Although they
have begun to rely upon satellites for their communication
needs more than ever, these older systems are still relied
on to provide connectivity in a protracted conflict. 121
120Johnson, Soviet Space Programs 1980-1985 , p. 65-73,
and Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C^I System," p. 213.
121Ball, "The Soviet Strategic C 3 I System," p. 212.
78
210 240 270 300 330 360 30 60 90 120 150 180
Figure 4-5. Ground Trace Path of a Geosychronous Satellite
The U.S. maintains four fixed command posts from
which strategic decisions are synthesized and acted upon.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has produced as many as
1500 of these types of facilities with special
communications capabilities. It is estimated that more
than 175,000 personnel can be sheltered and contribute to
maintaining essential production and services during a
nuclear war. 1^2
To relay strategic orders, an extensive system of
VLF radio stations would be used to communicate with the
122 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1984 ,
p. 40-41.
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SSBN's at sea. Relying in part on underground cables, they
have a certain degree of redundancy which provides a
measure of connectivity once an exchange starts. 123
Additionally, the Soviet Union has begun to invest in
development and construction of an ELF facility which will
also be capable of communicating with SSBN's. 124
Similar in nature to the U.S. Navy's TACAMO, the
Soviet Union has recently deployed the Bear J aircraft with
the capability of VLF communcations to SSBN's at sea. 125
However, the ability of the Soviet Union to field an
airborne command post as sophisticated as the U.S. NEACP
system has not been accomplished. 12 °
D. CONCLUSIONS
Soviet command and control functions are very capable
and are supported through a rigorously defined control
structure that has excellent technical support. The amount
of redundancy and system hardening that has been emphasized
in their C 3 I systems could provide them with the ability to
123Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Hersprina. The Soviet
Union and Strategic Arms (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984),
p. 30.
124 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 ,
p. 48.
125Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1988 ,
p. 48.
126Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of
the Committee on Appropriations, Telecommunications
,
Command and Control Programs . 96th Cong., 1st sess., 24
April 1979, p. 143.
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initiate and control a nuclear conflict. The Soviet space
system, which includes satellites and their control systems,
has been judged to be wartime survivable. In their drive to
maintain strict political and military control over their
nuclear weapons, they have succeeded in developing and
fielding a robust command and control system.
In many areas, the Soviet C 3 I systems are not as
technically capable as U.S. systems, especially in early
warning/attack assessment, airborne command post capability,
and satellite systems; however, the Soviets more than make
up for these deficiencies in duplication of systems and by
providing extensive protection of facilities. One area of
concern is that the Soviet Union has designed its space
systems to be able to perform in a wartime environment. The
Soviet Union is making great strides in resolving the
technical issues involved in supporting the command and
control architecture, but it still has a highly centralized
military infrastructure that lacks the flexibility to
delegate authority and expect independent action:
This weakness of the Soviet C 3 I system adds critical
support to the doctrinal predilection of Soviet
strategic planners to react to any actual or seemingly
imminent U.S. nuclear attack, no matter how limited or
supposedly controlled, with a massive response-
especially since it is known that U.S. strategic nuclear
targeting plans include a wide range of Soviet
leadership and C 3 I facilities. 127
127 Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?,"
Adelphi Papers Number One Hundred and Sixty-Nine (London:





It can be anticipated that in the 1990' s the Soviet Union
will continue to seek a more robust and survivable C 3 I
system.
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V. TECHNICAL FACTORS AFFECTING C3
IN A PROTRACTED NUCLEAR CONFLICT
In designing a C 3 system to support a protracted
nuclear warfighting capability, one of the primary
considerations to be addressed in the design stage should be
how the effects of nuclear weapons will impinge on the
system. The ability of the command and control structure to
withstand a nuclear blast and its attendant effects will
directly impact how the war will be fought and eventually
its outcome. A C 3 I system has many areas of vulnerability
including susceptibility to blast and shock effects, thermal
radiation, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . Each of these
effects will be addressed separately. The degree to which
these factors contribute to damage sustained by structures,
electronic equipment and personnel is dependent on the type
of burst—subsurface, surface, high altitude, or underwater-
-and the yield of the weapon. Current U.S. and Soviet C 3
architecture designs now take these factors into
consideration, and, consequently, robust and flexible
systems are becoming more prevalent and operational.
During tests conducted after World War II until the
Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty of 1962, it was demonstrated
that the effects varied, based on the weapon height of burst
and yield. The degree to which these effects can impinge on
any C 3 system depend on the physical hardening the systems
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have undergone, the EMP protection built into the system,
and the design of personnel protection systems.
A. BLAST AND SHOCK EFFECTS
In a low to moderate altitude or surface burst, several
different phenomena occur. These include the formation of
peak overpressure, the dynamic overpressure, the blast (or
shock) wave, and the reflected blast wave. A large portion
of the energy released by the explosion goes into the
formation and propagation of a shock wave generated by the
rapid expansion of heated gases in the immediate vicinity
of the explosion. This rapidly expanding wall of air loses
its energy to the atmosphere in the form of heat and slows
down as it moves outward. 128 The maximum value of air
pressurization is called the peak overpressure.
Most of the material damage caused by a nuclear weapon
is due—directly or indirectly—to the shock wave. The
distance to which this overpressure level will extend again
depends primarily on the energy yield of the explosion and
the height of burst. 129 As this shock wave travels away
from the source of the explosion, the pressures in the
front and behind it fall off in a regular manner. When the
128Kosta Tsipis, Arsenal; Understanding Weapons in
the Nuclear Age (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p.
271.
129Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects





wave has traveled a certain distance from the fireball, the
pressure behind the front drops below that of the
surrounding atmosphere and a so-called "negative phase" of
the blast wave forms. At the end of this negative phase the
ambient atmospheric pressure is essentially back to normal.
It is the combination of these two phenomena which causes
the extensive damage observed in above-ground hardened or
unhardened structures.
Another important quantity in the blast phenomena is
the formation of dynamic pressure. This is the air
pressure resulting from the mass air flow (or wind) behind
the shock from a blast wave. It is equal to the product of
half the density of the air through which the blast wave
passes and the square of the particle velocity behind the
shock front as it impinges on the object or structure. 130
The variation of overpressure and dynamic pressure with
time at fixed location is shown in Figure 5-1. 131
When an explosion occurs, an incident blast wave is
formed which passes through the atmosphere and eventually
reaches the earth's surface. When this wave strikes the
earth, it is reflected back outward toward the incident
wave. The four stages of the incident and reflected wave
130Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 632.
131Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 84.
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are shown in Figure 5-2. 132 In the region of the blast, two
separate shocks will be felt, one from the incident blast
wave and the other from the reflected wave. What occurs




Figure 5-1. Diagram of Overpressure Variation and Dynamic
Pressure Variation




Figure 5-2. Four Stages Of The Incident And Reflected Wave
As the incident wave moves outward, the reflected wave
is traveling through an atmosphere which has been heated
and is highly compressed. Since sound travels better in
this environment than in undisturbed air, the reflected
wave travels faster than the incident wave, and at some
point away from ground zero it will merge with it. This
fusing of the two waves forms a front perpendicular to the
ground known as the Mach stem. 133 As shown in Figure 5-3,
the point at which the incident wave, reflected wave, and




"Mach Y". The point continues to rise, and the height of
the Mach stem increases, causing only one shock wave to be











Figure 5-3. Triple Point Shock Wave or "Mach Y"
Utilizing changes in the height of burst and yield of
the weapon, these phenomena can be varied to inflict the
amount and type of damage desired for a particular target.
As the height of burst for an explosion of given energy
yeild is decreased, or as the energy yield for a given
height of burst increases, two consequences follow:
1. Mach reflection commences nearer to ground zero.
2
.
The overpressure at the surface near ground zero
becomes larger.
An actual contact surface burst leads to the highest
possible overpressures near ground zero. Also, cratering
and ground shock phenomena are observed; hence, physical
damage to structures is greatest. 135
134Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 88-90.




After blast and shock, the second most devastating
effect of a nuclear weapon is thermal radiation. In an
atmospheric detonation, about half the energy released is
emitted as X-rays which kinetically react with and heat up
the surrounding air to create the fireball. 136 It is this
pulse of thermal energy, traveling at the speed of light,
whose effects on the surrounding environment depend on
three properties of the source of radiation:
1. the intensity (how many thermal radiation photons
leave it each second)
2. the temperature (how energetic each photon is), and
3. the length of time the radiation is emitted by the
source. l37
The main concern with thermal radiation is the creation
of fires and subsequent firestorms which have the potential
for extensive damage to unprotected facilities and
eguipment. Even if a communications facility did not
sustain a direct hit, this effect could cause significant
damage to unshielded wiring, cables, and support structures.
Although the radiation attenuates at a rate roughly
eguivalent to one over the square of the distance (1/D2 ),
the atmospheric conditions directly contribute to its effect
and the amount of damage it inflicts.
136Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 276.
137Tsipis, Arsenal , p. 46.
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When the pulse of thermal radiation reaches an object,
part of it will be reflected, absorbed, or pass through the
material. When radiation is absorbed by a material, it
produces heat, which in turn determines the amount of
damage it will sustain. The composition of the material
also has a great deal to do with the amount of thermal
radiation absorbed. Since only a small proportion of the
heat generated by the pulse is dissipated by conduction in
the short time the material is exposed to the radiation,
the absorbed energy is largely confined to a shallow depth
of the material. Consequently, very high surface
temperatures are attained. 138
In their book The Effects of Nuclear Weapons , Glasstone
and Dolan point out a very interesting phenomenon:
An important consideration in connection with
charring and ignition of various materials and with the
production of skin burns by thermal radiation is the
rate at which the thermal radiation is delivered. For a
given total amount of thermal energy received by each
unit area of exposed material, the damage will be
greater if the energy were delivered rapidly rather than
slowly. . .
.
There is evidence that for thermal radiation pulses
of very short duration, such as might arise from air
bursts of low-yield weapons or from explosions of large
yield at high altitudes, this trend is reversed. In
other words, a given amount of energy may be less
effective if delivered in a very short pulse, . . .than in
one of moderate duration. .. In some experiments in which
certain materials were exposed to short pulses of
thermal radiation, it was observed that the surfaces
were rapidly degraded and vaporized. It appeared as if
the surface had been "exploded" off the material,
138Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons .
282-283.
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leaving the remainder with very little sign of damage.
The thermal energy incident upon the material was
apparently dissipated in the kinetic energy of the
"exploding" surface molecules before the radiation could
penetrate into the depth of the material. 139
The importance of this phenomenon should be apparent in the
application of exoatmospheric nuclear detonations and their
long range effects on orbiting satellites. Also, the effect
on exposed transmission and reception site equipment could
prove critical in maintaining required communication and
intelligence links to and from higher authority.
C. THE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) PHENOMENON
At no time will the requirement for a robust and
reliable communications system be more critical than during
a crisis preceding a nuclear conflict and during the actual
conduct of a nuclear strike. Until recently, one of the
most important yet least understood phenomenon concerning a
nuclear detonation was the effect of an electromagnetic
pulse (EMP)
.
EMP is a time-varying electromagnetic radiation which
increases very rapidly to a peak and then decays somewhat
more slowly. It has a very broad spectrum of frequencies,
ranging from very low to several hundred megahertz but
mainly in the radiofrequency (long wavelength) region. It
is this rapid increase in electromagnetic radiation and its
attendant conversion into strong electric currents and high
139Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 285-286.
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voltages which causes the damage to electrical and
electronic equipment. 140
In a nuclear detonation about 0.3% of the energy
released is carried by gamma rays that knock electrons from
their orbits around atoms of the surrounding atmosphere.
As these gamma rays move outward from the source of the
explosion, they continue to strip away electrons and push
them outward also. The larger, slower positively charged
ions are left behind. This action creates the powerful
current and voltage mentioned previously. 141
In a surface burst, the gamma rays will be emitted into
the ground and the atmosphere. Although quickly absorbed
by the earth, it can serve as an alternate path for the
electrons to return from the outer part of the deposition
region toward the burst point where the positively charged
ions, which have been left behind, predominate. The
electric field produced is very strong but its power falls
off rapidly with increasing distance from the deposition
region. Thus, in a surface burst, the greatest potential
hazard to electrical and electronic equipment from EMP will
be greatest in and around the deposition region. 142 (Fig.
5-4)




















Figure 5-4. Surface Burst Deposition Region
In high altitude bursts, the potential is far greater
for damage to electrical and electronic equipment. When
the explosion occurs, the gamma rays will react with the
atmosphere and strip a greater number of electrons from
their atoms. These electrons create a deposition area that
is pancake-shaped and may be up to fifty miles thick in the
center, tapering toward the edge, with a mean altitude of
twenty five to thirty miles. 143 Since there is little
atmosphere to slow this expansion down, the deposition area
expands over a great area. The EMP generated over this
area is long range and persistent. Additionally, the field
143Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 518.
93
strength remains fairly constant throughout the deposition
area. 144 (Fig. 5-5)
NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION





HORIZON FROM BURST POINT
(TANGENT POINT)
Figure 5-5. High Altitude Burst Deposition Region
It should be noted that the field strength observed at
the surface from a high altitude burst is one-tenth to a
hundredth of the field within the source region of a surface
burst; the field is influenced by the earth's magnetic
field. Also, the electric field strength varies by not more
than a factor of two for explosions with yields of a few
hundred kilotons or more. 145
As indicated, the effects of EMP can be devastating on
the full radio freguency range, as shown in Figure 5-6. The
effect on communication systems can seriously impact the
ability of the NCA to initiate, direct, and control nuclear
144 Tsipis, Arsenal, p. 60.
145Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 519.
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forces before, during and after a nuclear strike. One of
the keys to developing a robust and survivable command and
control system for nuclear warfare will lie in the design of
a system capable of withstanding the effects of a large EMP
pulse. This rigorous and challenging design criteria is
currently being employed in U.S. and Soviet systems for
ground, air, and space-based C 3 I systems.
D. SUMMARY
In order for the United States and the Soviet Union to
successfully pursue their objectives during a protracted
nuclear war, one of the critical options to consider is the
degradation, disruption, or elimination of the command and
control structure and its supporting elements necessary for
control and execution of the war. One step that can be
taken in this vein is to target the other's C 3 facilities.
This can be done in a myriad of ways, two of which
include direct targeting—utilizing the effects of blast and
shock and thermal radiation—and the use of EMP in a series
of accurately placed and properly timed detonations. By
capitalizing on the inherent effects of the weapons to be
employed, a proper weapons to target match can be made that
will achieve the desired goal. The subsequent loss of
direct control over the nuclear forces may result in a
hesitation or lack of a timely response allowing the other
side to achieve a decisive military and political advantage
95
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Figure 5-6. EMP Effects On Radio Frequency Ranges
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VI. U.S. AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON
RELEASE PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA
In the United States and Soviet Union, particular
attention and effort is given to the flow of information
and commands for controlling the nuclear forces. This is
especially true regarding the set of procedures and
guidelines used for weapons readiness posture and weapons
release. In both systems of command and control a strict
heirarchy of command is followed, and numerous support
systems are utilized. Both countries have redundant
systems, each of which is designed to be capable of
supporting the respective NCA's in decisionmaking.
Each has placed an increasing degree of emphasis on the
survivability of the chain of command, political as well as
military, and the systems used to provide intelligence and
warning, and communications support. The Soviet Union has
long emphasized the necessity of a surviving control
structure in a nuclear environment, and the United States
has recently begun to embrace this philosophy in earnest as
well
.
Previous chapters have covered the various U.S. and
Soviet systems which support the strategic command and
control architecture peculiar to fighting a nuclear
conflict. This chapter will bring the procedures and
systems into focus for their ability to support each
97
country's desire to be capable of fighting a protracted
nuclear conflict and prevailing at the termination of
hostilities.
A. U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS RELEASE PROCEDURES
Utilizing the chain of succession in the Executive and
Defense Departments, the NCA is the lead body responsible
for making the decision to increase readiness or respond to
a national threat. The United States has oriented its C 3 I
systems to deal with a nuclear confrontation with the
Soviet Union which most likely will be a result of a crisis
and not a surprise attack. Despite this, the United States
continues to develop systems capable of sustaining a
surprise attack with no strategic warning and minimal
tactical warning and, while not maintaining a full
capability to "ride out" a devastating strike, it could
respond with all three legs of the triad destroying much of
the Soviet Unions' nuclear forces, economic recovery base,
and political-military control base.
Before considering the procedures used to execute the
SIOP, it would be helpful to review the various groupings
and options often attributed to it. The four principal
groups are Soviet nuclear forces, general purposes forces,
Soviet military and political leadership centers, and the
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Soviet economic and industrial base. 146 The SIOP is
reportedly further divided into four general categories of
options available for the employment of nuclear weapons:
Major Attack Options (MAO's), Selective Attack Options
(SAO's), Limited Nuclear Options (LNO's), and Regional
Nuclear Options (RNO's). 147
For many years, the United States had adopted a "launch
on impact" force posture in which it was assumed that
weapons release criteria were not met until positive
verification of Soviet weapons exploding on U.S. soil had
been confirmed. The second status, referred to as "launch
on warning" and reportedly adopted by the U.S. as part of
the SIOP in the late 1970' s, occurs when strategic and
tactical warning of sufficient reliability indicates an




The United States currently relies on a system of
tactical warning based on the principle of dual
phenomenology. This procedure calls for NORAD to verify an
146Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 1872:
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Department of
Defense
. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 14 February 1979, p. 186.
147 Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SIOP, 1960-
1983," Strategic Nuclear Targeting , eds. Desmond Ball and
Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986),
p. 81.
148Bruce G. Blair, Strategic Command and Control
,
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 235.
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attack from at least two independent sources. It provides
some degree of safety in ascertaining the reliability of an
actual attack, giving the NCA critical information required
to classify the attack, determine the scope, and select an
appropriate response.
Once an indication of an attack is received by NORAD,
SAC, and NMCC, a conference call is immediately established
among these commands and the NCA to determine the validity
of the data and select a course of action. If an attack is
determined to be underway, an Emergency Action Message (EAM)
is sent by the President. The EAM is a coded message which
orders the execution of one or several options contained in
the SIOP. The message should contain a minimum of four
pieces of information:
1. a number or code letter indicating the strike option
selected, taken from a menu specifying target
class (es) , selected from the SIOP




a code authenticating the message as having originated
with an authorized commander, and
4. a code enabling the crew to carry launch sequence to
completion 149
This message is the vehicle used by the NCA and designated
149Ashton B. Carter, "Communications Technologies and
Vulnerabilities," Managing Nuclear Operations , eds. Ashton
B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, Charles A. Zraket
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), p.
223.
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authorities to provide for positive weapon control and
release.
Over a period of years, the United States has developed
a very thorough system capable of providing the military and
political leadership with the tools necessary for releasing
nuclear weapons. One procedure is a system requiring two
personnel, with adequate knowledge of the weapon system and
the required training, to have access to the weapons. This
"two-man rule" prevents only one person from having
unauthorized access to a weapon or its components. The
personnel involved in this type of work have undergone a
screening through either the Air Force or Navy Personnel
Reliability Program (PRP). 150
A device called a Permissive Action Link (PAL) is
another method used for control of nuclear weapons. This
idea for exercising better control over nuclear weapons came
about in the late 1950* s. In 1962 President Kennedy signed
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 160 requiring
PALS on most nuclear weapons. 151 Since then an elaborate
set of procedures has been adopted in the launch control
system of ICBM and SLBM strategic missiles. It has been
speculated that the decision to install PALS on nuclear
150Daniel Ford, The Button: The Pentagon's Strategic




151Donald R. Cotter, "Peacetime Operations," Managing
Nuclear Operations , p. 49.
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weapons did much to alleviate Soviet fears of an early first
use of nuclear weapons instead of its intended and stated
purpose of preventing unauthorized launches. 152
The principle behind a PAL is relatively simple. When
an EAM is received, the release code is entered into the
weapons, giving them the capability to arm themselves when
fired. PALS can have as few as four digits or as many as
twelve. If a mistake is made while attempting to unlock a
PAL, only a limited number of tries are permitted. The PAL
is considered to be the "weak link" in the design of the
weapon. Attempts to bypass the PAL or tamper with the
weapon may cause the arming mechanism to become inoperative
before any of the other components. 153 (Figure 6-1)
When a launch order is received by an ICBM Launch
Control Center (LCC) , the two officers on duty separately
decode and authenticate the message to ensure its validity
and accuracy. Once confirmed, the digits unlocking the PAL
are inserted. Continuing the launch sequence involves each
officer then inserting a launch key into a pair of widely
separated keyholes. The keys must be turned simultaneously
to initiate a launch sequence. 154
152Jeremy J. Stone, "Presidential First Use is
Unlawful," First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Under the
Constitution, Who Decides? . ed. Peter Raven-Hansen
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 13-14.
153 Ford, The Button , p. 117.


















Weak links fail before
strong link can fail
Figure 6-1. "Strong Link-Weak Link" Principle in Nuclear
Weapon Design
An additional control procedure incorporated into LCC '
s
is the requirement for a separate crew in another LCC to
also turn their keys confirming the launch orders. In the
event a number of LCC ' s are destroyed or incapacitated,
control reverts to the surviving LCC's, even to the point
where one LCC could launch the surviving ICBM's. 155 The
importance of this feature is critical, considering its
applicability and usefulness to conducting a protracted
155 Ford, The Button , p. 118.
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nuclear conflict where control of subsequent strikes could
effect launch operations.
Although ICBM's have incorporated PAL's as part of the
weapons system, the Navy has not adopted the PAL devices on
SLBM's and instead relies on the nuclear weapons surety
program to prevent unauthorized access or launching of
missiles. In this case, when the EAM is received, it is
decoded and authenticated by two teams of officers (not
including the commanding oficer, weapons officer, or
navigator, whom have separate functions in the launch
sequence). Once this is done, special keys are then issued
to personnel so that a series of "permission" switches can
be closed in a prescribed sequence, thereby, completing the
launch requirements. 156
As shown, the planning and preparation for a nuclear
exchange is long and detailed. When the strategic warning
and information fusion centers such as NORAD, SAC, and NMCC
receive indications of an imminent or inbound attack, they
must quickly determine the validity of the data, and upon
verification notify the NCA in order to commence SIOP
execution utilizing an EAM. The SIOP options must be
clearly laid out and readily available to the President or
his successor to allow for selection of an option and
execution in a timely manner. There will be little time to
decide on strategies and even less time given no warning.
156Cotter, "Peacetime Operations," p. 52.
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B. SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPON RELEASE PROCEDURES
The Soviet Union has postulated three conditions of
readiness in preparing for nuclear war. Similar in nature
to the United States, they function under conditions of
peacetime operations, a crisis environment, and, lastly, the
imminent outbreak of hostilities or the commencement of
war. Their operating conditions under peacetime are
similar to the United States', but under crisis and wartime
there are significant shifts in political and military
procedures
.
In peacetime the Soviet Union performs like any country
with the leadership tending to the day-to-day matters of
state. The Soviet NCA and its attendant authority over
nuclear weapons is vested in one of three possible
organizations. First is the Politburo since it controls
Soviet national decisionmakir g and hence political-military
control over nuclear weapons. Second would be the Defense
Council. As a powerful state organization, it is
responsible for the national security issues facing the
country and is well suited to handle the flow of
information that would occur in the event of a surprise
attack. Third is the General Secretary. As head of the
Politburo and chairman of the Defense Council, he is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This may be the
most likely since it has been observed that the Soviet
"football" was present at Leonid Brezhnev's funeral,
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thereby lending credence to the General Secretary's role in
the nuclear force chain of command. 157
In the event of a surprise attack, the issuance of a
launch order would be based on the tactical information
received, and the critical decision regarding whether to
launch-on-warning or attempt to "ride out" the first attack
would be made. One consideration that would weigh heavily
in the decisionmaking process is the amount of time
available to choose a course of action.
In a crisis or wartime scenario, the General Secretary
would still play a lead role in the conduct of military
readiness and operations, but the Politburo would have time
to influence his decisions and actions. Like the United
States, the Soviet Union has most likely designated
successors to the General Secretary, and they would be
covertly dispersed to hardened command centers around
Moscow and elsewhere within the country to provide a
continuing line of authority in the event the General
Secretary was wiped out in a strike.
An additional precaution that could be taken would be
the increased readiness of the Soviet equivalent to the
NEACP, an increase in communications to strategic forces,
and activation of additional radar facilities located
throughout the country. One key advantage the Soviet Union
157
"Catching the Soviet Football on Film," Newsweek . 1
August 1983, as cited in Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear
Operations," Managing Nuclear Operations , p. 484.
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has over the United States is the redundancy and
interoperability of communications systems from the
strategic level down to the tactical troop level. This
feature allows for escalation control in a conflict and a
tight rein over the actions of engaged forces. The orders
to launch weapons can be communicated through HF, UHF line-
of-sight and UHF relay, land lines and cables, and
satellites.
Once the decision to launch has been made, the order is
relayed from the General Staff to the main staff of SRF
(RVSN) for relay to the ICBM command posts in the field or
the General Staff can communicate directly with the command
posts, bypassing the RVSN. 158 No information has yet been
published concerning the composition of nuclear release
orders or the specific breakdown of the Soviet equivalent
to the United States' SIOP, called the RISOP.
Although no specific information has been obtained
concerning the RISOP, Soviet writings have given some clue
as to the objectives, strategy, and operating principles
obtained within it:
1. Destroy most threatening enemy forces, usually
interpretted to mean U.S. ICBM fields.
158 A. Yeveseyev and 0. Gurov, "Organizatsiya
informatsionnoy rabot v General'nom shtabe, shtabakh
frontov i armiy," Vovenno-istoricheskiv zhurnal , no. 3,
March 1981 14; Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New
York: Macmillan, 1981), p. 56; Department of Defense,
Soviet Military Power 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1981) 55, as cited in Meyer,
"Soviet Nuclear Operations," p. 495.
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2. Select main "links" and nodes in target set, referring
to command authority and related communications
capability.
3. Do not destroy large areas or create radioactive
deserts.
4. Use minimum yields to avoid "overkill" of the target.
5. Targeting of population and all industry is
unnecessarily destructive and not effective.
6. Strike simultaneously in several TVD's.
7. Prepare to strike "most important" targets twice.
8. Political leaders will determine relative weight
of strikes in the various TVD's. 159
These basic tenets also closely follow the doctrine and
strategy espoused by the Soviet Union for many years,
thereby lending some degree of credibility to their
formulation and accuracy.
The Soviet Union still considers the procedures and
communications to nuclear forces to be of paramount
importance and, as such, it has invested considerable time
in developing a set of procedures and equipment capable of
supporting this requirement. The flexibility of the system
is considered very good, and it certainly has the requisite
facilities needed to conduct not only a first-strike attack
but also follow-on strikes as required. The amount of
control that would be delegated to TVD commanders in a
strategic conflict is unknown; however the means to carry
159William T. Lee, "Soviet Nuclear Targeting,"
Strategic Nuclear Targeting , p. 97.
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out such an order are in place, operationally tested, and
ready for use should a conflict occur.
109
VII. NET ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY
IN A PROTRACTED NUCLEAR CONFLICT
Since the United States and the Soviet Union achieved
parity in their nuclear weapons, each side has sought to
shift the balance of power to their favor. Commencing in
the early 1970' s, the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear force
modernization effort still goes unmatched in the West.
They have devoted significant effort to weapons system
yield, accuracy, throw weight, and survivability. They have
also spent considerable effort modernizing their command and
control structure to afford them the means of conducting a
protracted nuclear exchange and achieving their war aims.
The United States, on the other hand, has been slow to
modernize and only recently began to upgrade weapons
systems, intelligence and warning platforms, and command and
control facilities.
The United States and Soviet Union now supposedly
possess threat warning and attack assessment forces
sophisticated enough that plans for a surprise "bolt-out-of-
the-blue" attack are rarely addressed. By observing
historical actions and writings, it appears the United
States has always been more prone to plan for this
contingency. Current readiness levels are a prime
indication of this relationship. Today, more than 80
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percent of Soviet ICBM's, carrying more than 95 percent of
the Soviet's ICBM-based warheads, are ready to be launched
on short notice; 3 to 4 percent of Soviet SSBN's are on
alert, with only 20 percent on station to launch a strike;
and no intercontinental bombers are on either air or ground
alert status. 160
The United States, on the other hand, maintains a much
higher readiness posture. The alert rate for ICBM's is
kept at approximately 98 percent. 161 Usually only 30
percent of the bombers are kept on alert and 50 percent of
the submarines. 162 The higher rate for submarines is due to
the Blue/Gold two crew manning system employed by the Navy
whereby two seperate crews are assigned to the same
submarine, allowing quicker turn-around time in port.
Although these readiness postures indicate the availability
of forces on a day-to-day basis, in a generated alert
situation the forces available could go much higher for each
leg of the triad.
These readiness levels set the stage for evaluating
whether or not the United States or the Soviet Union has
160Stephen M. Meyer, "Soviet Nuclear Operations,"
Managing Nuclear Operations , eds. Ashton B. Carter, John D.
Steinbruner, Charles A. Zraket (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 494.
161John M. Collins, U.S. -Soviet Military Balance;
Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 (New York: McGraw-Hill
Publications Co., 1980), p. 129.
162Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980 's
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 32.
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the capability to initiate a nuclear conflict and endure
through it to achieve a workable war termination. As
observed by Stephen J. Cimbala:
The search for enduring C 3 systems may divert attention
from the search for forces and commanders that are
'merely' survivable. The U.S. -Soviet arms race has been
stimulated by the concerns of each side for the
survivability of its forces and command structure
against preemptive attack. Improved capabilities for
protracted war do not necessarily lessen the danger of
preemption, and might increase the danger. While the
odds in favor of simple decapitiation go down, the odds
in favor of multiple dysfunction might increase. Social
systems, including the command structures for
retaliatory forces, cannot be programmed only to do
what their designers expect, or hope. 163
A. U.S. C3 SURVIVABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
On July 25, 1980, PD-59 which bore the title "Nuclear
Weapons Employment Policy" was signed. This directive
altered U.S. nuclear strategy in two fundamental ways.
First, it shifted targeting emphasis from the economic
recovery targeting mandated in NSDM-242, to the targeting of
Soviet political and military assets, strategic military
targets, leadership targets, and Other Military Targets
(OMT)
. Second, it mandated development of the capability to
wage a protracted nuclear conflict. Two additional
presidential directives were also reportedly adopted which
supported PD-59. PD-53, entitled "National Security
Telecommunications Policy," and PD-58, entitled "Continuity
163 Stephen J. Cimbala, Nuclear War and Nuclear





of Government," set the stage for increased emphasis on
flexible and enduring communications systems capable of
supporting the NCA and its chains of succession in the event
of a nuclear conflict. 164
When President Reagan assumed office, he reaffirmed the
strategy espoused in PD-59 and issued his own doctrine
statement in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)
13. Using this directive, the United States embarked on
the ambitious Strategic Modernization Program. In his
Fiscal Year 1983 Annual Report to the Congress, Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger expanded on the purpose behind
the modernization effort one step further:
The United States will maintain a strategic nuclear
force posture such that, in a crisis, the Soviets will
have no incentive to initiate a nuclear attack on the
United States or our allies. U.S. forces will be
capable under all conditions of war initiation to
survive a Soviet first strike and retaliate in a way
that permits the United States to achieve its
objectives. Nuclear weapons systems will not be funded
merely to make our forces mirror Soviet forces
according to some superficial tally of missiles or
aircraft deployed in peacetime. Obtaining a facade of
symmetry between U.S. and Soviet forces in terms of such
simplistic counts is not a requirement for which I would
allocate scarce defense dollars. Instead, our goal will
be to gain and maintain a nuclear deterrent force which
provides us an adequate margin of safety with emphasis
on enduring survivability (emphasis added). 165
164Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13, and the Reagan
Strategic Modernization Program," Nuclear Strategy, Arms
Control and the Future , eds. P. Edward Haley, David M.
Keithly, and Jack Merritt (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985)
,
p. 124-126.
165Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of
Defense, Caspar W. Weinberger, to the Congress on the FY
1983 Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987
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This statement summarizes the requirement for the United
States to maintain a C 3 system capability to sustain a
protracted conflict and prevent the Soviets from achieving
their war aims.
To date, the United States has initiated a series of
programs designed to enhance the survivability
characteristics of the C 3 system. Upgrades in physical and
EMP hardening as well as improvements in communications have
underscored the desire to achieve a flexible C 3 system
capable of sustained combat operations in a protracted
nuclear war.
1. EMP Hardening
EMP hardening has been the main focus of funding
during the Strategic Modernization Program. All new
strategic systems funded for present and future deployment
have had EMP hardening as a primary consideration in design,
full scale development, and operational deployments. Future
systems scheduled to benefit from this effort include the
NAVSTAR GPS system including the NDS subsystem onboard, the
MILSTAR satellite system, GWEN, and the E-6A TACAMO
aircraft.
Although little information exists on exact Soviet
targeting policy, it has been postulated that high altitude
multi-megatonnage bursts above the United States could be
Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1982), p. 1-17.
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used to disrupt critical C2 communication links. 166
Upgrades to currently existing systems are also underway.
Of extreme importance in maintaining strategic connectivity
to NMCC, ANMCC, SAC, and NORAD, the E-4B NEACP aircraft was
built with EMP hardening incorporated from the ground up. 167
Also, current versions of the DSCS III satellites, DMSP
satellites, and FLTSATCOM satellites have taken EMP
hardening aspects into consideration. The systems listed so
far pertain mostly to communications, there has also been
significant effort put forth in hardening the early warning
portion of strategic forces as well.
Very little concrete information exists on the exact
effects of EMP. Much of the data obtained to date has been
gleaned from the analysis of atmospheric test data,
underground explosions, computer simulations, calculated
projections and non-nuclear explosions. 168 One point to be
considered, however, is that for high altitude bursts to
have a degrading EMP effect on electronic equipment, the
166Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, The Soviet
Union and Strategic Arms (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984)
,
p. 81-82.
167 Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook , 1st ed. , ed.




168Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects
of Nulcear Weapons
. 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 514.
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yield must be in the megaton range. 169 It should be noted
that the Soviet Union currently possesses these multi-
megaton warheads which are ideally suited for such attacks.
The United States, however, does not possess any warheads of
this size on a delivery system suited for high altitude
bursts.
The amount of EMP hardening built into U.S. command
and control systems is highly classified and the degree to
which they could withstand the continued shock of EMP
bursts over the continued period projected in a protracted
nuclear conflict is unknown. Microelectronic components
are extremely susceptible to variances in electrical current
and degradation can quickly occur if not adequately
protected by shielding and grounding. Existing systems have
never been put to the "test" of combat; therefore, their
anticipated performance is an educated guess at best.
2 . Physical Hardening
The physical hardening of command and control
facilities has long been neglected in the United States due
to budgetary constraints and political biases concerning
the deterrent value of such an action. In light of
appearing to believe that nuclear war can be fought and won,
given a secure facility from which the battle could be
conducted, the Reagan Adminstration backed away from
169Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 516.
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earlier statements regarding the requirement for "enduring
survivability". Additionally, all follow-on inquiries
regarding this subject have been explained away by denying
the plausibility of having these types of facilities.
Of the four major command and control centers
associated with strategic forces, only the ANMCC and NORAD
have any degree of physical hardening protection. The
NMCC, located in the Pentagon, has no physical hardening
attributed to it; and given a one megaton burst at less
than two miles, the structure would sustain severe damage
which would degrade if not eliminate its usefulness as a
data fusion and command and control center. 170 The
facility at SAC headquarters at Offutt AFB is likewise an
unhardened facility capable of withstanding less than
twenty psi overpressure. 171 Although a new command center
was completed in late 1988, it too is reportedly only 30-50
feet underground and is not capable of sustaining a direct
hit or near miss. The United States only possesses two
types of mobile systems for strategic command and control:
the E-4B and the EC-135. These aircraft are limited in
number, and the support facilities required for continual
maintenance may prove their undoing in a conflict. This
170Glasstone and Dolan, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons ,
p. 216, 219.
171Theodore Jarvis, "Nuclear Operations and Strategic
Defense," Managing Nuclear Operations , p. 662.
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also discounts the possibility of follow-on strikes incurred
in a continuing conflict.
When it was constructed in the 1960's, the facility
in Cheyenne Mountain, known as NORAD, was considered a
hardened facility. With increased progress in weapons
yield and accuracy, this command post soon became
physically vulnerable and could be incapacitated with a
dedicated first strike or retaliatory strikes. 172 Although
this is the United States' most hardened facility, this
weakness is still inherent today and due to budgetary
constraints, no plans exist to move the facility or provide
additional hardening by moving it under Cheyenne Mountain.
The only other facility to have any degree of
hardening incorporated into its design is the ANMCC at Ft.
Ritchie, Maryland. The post is located within the Catocin
mountains and its survivability has been rated as moderate
at best. 173 It serves as the transition facility by which
transfer of control from the ground facilities to airborne
command posts could be effected in an orderly fashion
during the brief period between detection of an inbound
172Jarvis, "Nuclear Operations and Strategic Defense,"
p. 662.
173 Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068:
Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services , 9 5th Cong.
,
1st sess., 1 February 1977, p. 1055.
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ICBM attack and weapons impact. 174 Although not classified
as one of the primary command and control facilities, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) facility at
Mount Weather, Virginia serves as a backup ANMCC. It has
all the communications systems the NCA might need during and
after a nuclear attack but is no less vulnerable that Ft.
Ritchie. 175
The command post rated which is rated as most
survivable in a nuclear conflict is the NEACP aircraft.
With airborne refueling, it is designed to remain aloft for
up to 72 hours. 176 The aircraft requires at least 30
minutes to warm up equipment and go through preflight
checks, possibly making the aircraft subject to destruction
in a surprise attack. Originally stationed at Andrews AFB
outside Washington, D.C., it was considered too vulnerable
and was moved to Grissom AFB, Indiana in 1983. 177
Little information is available concerning the
existence of other hardened command and control facilities.
There are six sites other than Mount Weather which are
174 Bruce Blair, Strategic Command and Control.
Redefining the Nuclear Threat (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 109.
175Desmond Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?
,
"
Adelphi Papers Number One Hundred and Sixty-Nine (London:




176Defense Electronics, C3I Handbook , 1st ed., p. 114.
177 Blair, Strategic Command and Control , p. 189.
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operated by FEMA, but little information on them is
available. The United States is well prepared to operate
under the adverse conditions that would typify the start of
a nuclear exchange, but the ability to wage a protracted
conflict beyond a few hours or days is questionable.
No Soviet writings indicate a desire to exclude
U.S. command and control facilities or capabilities from
targeting. This policy leaves open the question of how and
with whom they could conduct war termination. The ability
of the NCA to maintain connectivity and control over the
nuclear forces must be preserved if reconstitution of
forces is to occur, the fight continued, and the conflict
concluded.
B. SOVIET C3 SURVIVABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
The Soviet Union has always considered a conflict with
the West to be inevitable. During the 1970' s, the Soviet
Union fully integrated the use of nuclear weapons as an
extension of a conventional arms conflict. A. A. Kir'ian, a
Soviet military analyst, stated it quite succinctly:
A future war could be fought with both conventional and
nuclear arms; beginning with conventional arms, it could
at a definite stage become transformed into a nuclear
war." 178
178M.M. Kir'ian, ed., Voenno-tekhnicheskii progress
i vooruzhennve silv SSSR (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982)
,
p.
312 as cited in Laird and Herspring, The Soviet Union
and Strategic Arms , p. 25.
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Today, the Soviet Union's policies have evolved
slightly. They anticipate that a nuclear confrontation
will arise from a crisis situation and a conflict could
initiate at the conventional level. During this stage in
the conflict, it is quite possible that nuclear weapons will
be called into use and they could prove to be the decisive
factor in war termination and victory. 179 To support this,
the Soviets have developed and synthesized a complex and
reliable command and control heirarchy.
Desmond Ball has observed the degree of centralized
control that would probably be prevalent in a nuclear
exchange:
...the highly centralized procedure employed by the
Soviet command-and-control expose the whole system to
disruption. Observation of Soviet military exercises
gives the impression that ships, aircraft and commands
have carefully and specially planned roles, and that
operational communications flow directly between
headquarters in Moscow and the individual units in the
field. Local commanders seem to have relatively little
scope to adapt general orders to field conditions or to
use their own initiative if they do not receive central
orders. This tendency could be even more pronounced in
the strategic forces, since Soviet leaders would be
particularly loath to allow lower commanders much room
for initiative where nuclear weapons were concerned. 180
Many of the supporting systems have been pointed out in
previous chapters, but their ability to function in the
demanding environment of a protracted nuclear conflict and
prevail needs to be addressed.
179Laird and Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic
Arms , p. 25.
180Ball, "Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?," p. 45.
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1. EMP Hardening
The United States has targeted Soviet C 3 and
political-military facilities since the adoption of PD-59
and NSDD-13. In adopting this strategy one must question
the degree to which the Soviet Union has armored their
electronic and computer-based command and control system to
prevent disruption from the effects of EMP. To an extent,
they still rely on tube-technology in their communication
systems which significantly enhances the immunity of their
C 3 system to disruption. 181 In addition to not knowing how
much effort has been devoted to EMP hardening of systems,
the exact locations of many command and control centers
remain unknown, thereby complicating the targeting
effort. 182
Like the United States, the Soviet Union faces a
similar problem in how the devolution of command will work
if the Soviet NCA is unable to maintain connectivity with
the nuclear forces. Although the Soviets do have an
airborne command post, the degree of sophistication is
questionable and the amount of EMP hardening, if any, is
181William C. Martel and Paul L. Savage, Strategic
Nuclear War: What the Superpowers Target and Why
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 69.
182Martel and Savage, Strategic Nuclear War , p. 85.
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unknown. 183 According to John Steinbruner of the Brookings
Institutuion:
Although the Soviets have made extensive investments in
measures to protect their command systems and, whether
by intention or necessity, have utilized relatively
primitive communications equipment significantly less
sensitive to nuclear weapons effects, the consequence of
their systematic attention to the subject appears to be
awareness of exposure rather than confidence in secure
protection. 184
2 . Physical Hardening
The Soviets place great emphasis on maintaining
control over nuclear weapons at the highest levels of
government and delegation of this authority is not
anticipated under any circumstances. It is because of this
reason that the Soviet have taken such extensive efforts to
ensure the survival of the leadership in the event of a
nuclear war. The great number of hardened command and
control bunkers is a prime indicator of their intentions.
In the early 1980' s, the Soviets began to espouse
the view that nuclear war might not be a spasm attack and
could be protracted in nature. This statement coincided
with a new round of construction of deep underground
facilities designed to protect the political and military
leadership. Also, the support infrastructure provided in
183 Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on
Appropriations, Telecommunications. Command and Control
Programs: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Department
of Defense . 96th Cong., 1st sess., 24 April 1979, p. 143.
184John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation,"
Foreign Policy 45, Winter 1981-82, p. 20.
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these facilities is quite substantial, according to the
Defense Department's Soviet Military Power: An Assessment
of the Threat 1988 :
A highly redundant communications system, consisting of
both on-site and remote elements, supports these
complexes and permits the leadership to send orders and
receive reports through the wartime management
structure. 18 ^
The current Soviet system provides at least 80
command and control facilities just around the Moscow area.
Additionally, more than 1500 alternate hardened bunkers have
been built to accommodate roughly 175,000 key Party and
government personnel throughout the Soviet Union. 186
C. CONCLUSIONS
While little is actually known or available in open
sources concerning Soviet capabilities to ensure
connectivity and decisionmaking during a protracted nuclear
conflict, they have implemented many programs designed to
withstand such an environment. Their reliance on redundant
communications systems which make extensive use of
underground cables and EMP shielding, combined with their
unwavering requirement for hardened command and control
facilities for political and military officials, stresses
185Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 60.
186Martel and Savage, Strategic Nuclear War , p. 56, and
Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1987
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987),
p. 52 .
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the degree to which they desire to directly control the war
effort, especially the nuclear dimension. This is very
important considering that estimates to knock out the entire
Soviet command system would require more than two thousand
warheads. Even then, it is probably not possible to
completely isolate the Soviet leadership from the strategic
forces or impair Soviet strategic intelligence flow. 187
Expenditure of effort on these programs continues and
should be taken at face value for the warfighting capability
it gives them.
187Daniel Ford, The Button: The Pentagon's Strategic





VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES' APPROACH TO
FIGHTING A PROTRACTED NUCLEAR CONFLICT
A. CONCLUSIONS
In developing a realistic and workable strategy for
fighting a protracted nuclear war, the United States has
made significant strides in improving weapons capability in
accuracy and yield, in data processing capability using
computer upgrades, and, most important, in communications
improvements to strategic forces. Obviously, all these
improvements could be much broader in scope and more
capable than those already in place or planned, but fiscal
restraints and the dynamics of a democratic form of
government place ceilings and restrictions on new systems
implementation.
Many approaches have been proposed to enhance the
utility of command and control as it pertains to a
protracted nuclear war. The systems in place now and the
future command and control systems require design and
update specifications that include those criteria
—
endurance, survivability, su s t a i nab i 1 i ty , and
flexibility. 188
188Christopher I. Branch, Fighting a Long Nuclear War:
A Strategy, Force, Policy Mismatch (Washington, D.C.:





Regardless of whether or not the United States receives
indications and warning concerning a strategic nuclear
exchange with the Soviet Union, the C 3 I systems required to
support this conflict beyond the initial outbreak will have
to have been developed, deployed, and operational if they
are to be of any use. The United States has made
significant strides in recent years in fielding systems
capable of surviving the the devastation of the initial
onslaught. However, the considerations of military strategy
versus political realities and the attendant conflicts of
interest inherent in this dialogue go far in shaping U.S.
strategic doctrine. As noted by Branch:
In the United States, planners have often been reluctant
to tackle the "unthinkable" long war and deal with the
loathsome details of such an abhorrent subject. The
repugnance of this topic as well as convenience of not
needing to plan beyond a single strike-counterstrike
kept strategic thinkers away from serious public
examinations of nuclear warfighting. Limited resources,
too, made the short-war scenario easier to deal with. 189
The effects of this discussion are readily apparent in the
problems encountered during the installation of the GWEN and
ELF communications systems.
The minimum essential portions of these systems are now
installed and operational, but several years were spent
pacifying concerned citizens as to the absolute need for
their existance. The issues surrounding nuclear warfare
189 Branch, Fighting A Long Nuclear War , p. 10.
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must no longer be dealt with in such a secretive and "taboo"
manner. Enlightened discussion of the positions held by the
United States and Soviet Union might go far in assuaging the
inherent biases involved in this topic.
Once these obstacles are reduced or overcome, the
problem still remains that the United States is beginning
to possess a survivable command and control system, but
very little exists in the way of enduring systems. Although
current command and control systems may be survivable to the
point of an initial exchange, they must have the capability
to endure repeated attack and still function as required to
maintain connectivity to the forces. All systems put into
operation within the last few year and those scheduled to be
placed into operation in the 1990 's have incorporated some
degree of EMP hardening into their design. The amount of
physical hardening that each has received is subject to
debate on a system by system basis.
The problem still lies in that fact that no concerted
effort is being made to coordinate and develop a systematic
and progressive approach to reconstituting the NCA and the
nuclear forces once their connectivity has been disrupted by
a nuclear strike. A number of options exist that would help
in alleviating this problem:
1. Develop Post-Attack Reconstitution Procedures
Develop a set of prearranged and preauthorized
procedures for the chains of succession in the NCA to
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contact each other and establish the leading person for NCA
responsibilities. This is for both the Executive and
Department of Defense chains. These procedures should also
be followed by surviving strategic forces—ICBM facilities,
bombers, and SSBN's in port and at sea.
Provide provisions for continued smooth transition
from one command and control facility to the next. A
straightforward set of criteria that must be met should
suffice. This will reduce or eliminate the possibility for
hesitation or miscalculation in choosing a follow-on course
of action. The process of reconstitution is critical if any
semblance of a coordinated continuation of the conflict is
to occur.
2. Develop Robust Communications Equipment
Procure more aircraft capable of carrying out the
functions currently performed by NEACP. Additionally,
develop and field a series of communications equipments
capable of utilizing the full range of radio frequency
options, including a portable satellite capability. This
capability will be especially important in the
reconstitution of SSBN forces at sea which must be fully
integrated into any coordinated follow-on strikes.
3
.
Develop a Long-Term Survivable Aircraft Support
Scheme
This applies to the NEACP capable aircraft that will
require maintenance support. The designation of relocation
facilities that have prestaged maintenance packages capable
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of providing aircraft maintenance and fueling needs, as well
as electronic replacement and repair needs will be necessary
for sustained combat operations.
4. Develop Threat Warning/Attack Assessment
Reconstitution Procedures
Develop the procedures to reconstitute those
surviving facilities capable of providing threat warning and
attack assessment support to deter follow-on strikes. This
should include those assets available for conducting battle
damage assessment and determining what post-attack options
can be executed based on available forces. This may consist
of activating prestaged relocatable OTH-B radar units along
anticipated approach corridors and reconstituting satellite
assets that may have survived.
5. Hardened Facility Construction
Construct a number of hardened command and control
facilities capable of withstanding a dedicated attack and
executing the recovery and reconstitution of remaining
forces. A series of these facilities will be required since
follow-on strikes will probably incapacitate or destroy
them.
6. Develop Robust Command and Control Platforms and
Supporting Equipment
Procure more aircraft capable of carrying out the
functions currently performed by NEACP. The four aircraft
in use today may not be adequate for providing continued
support required in a protracted conflict. Develop and
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field a ground-mobile facility. Produce and disperse a
number of these facilites throughout the United States to
provide as much redundancy as possible. As stated by Ford
in The Button ;
Such command posts, if they were properly designed and
deployed, might substantially reduce the risk of a
decapitating attack. They would deny the Soviets an
easy shot at the present U.S. command system, in other
words, if they were built in sufficient number, suitably
dispersed, and if the delegation procedures were
streamlined so that if the President were killed, the
surviving commanders could collaborate to issue an
Emergency Action Message. 19 ^
The main problem facing this approach lies in the capability
of such a small facility to receive, process, analyze, and
coordinate the necessary post-attack information required to
plan continued follow-on strikes.
7. Develop a Protracted Nuclear War Annex to the SIOP
Develop an annex to the SIOP which fully integrates
the strategic reserve forces into a protracted version of
SIOP execution. It should possess flexibility in the manner
of reconstituting and executing remaining strategic nuclear
forces and should also address the inclusion, at this point,
of tactical weapons in strategic roles.
Even if only a minimum of communications and warning
systems remained intact, the facilites to direct their
efforts exist only minimally. The Soviet Union has
reportedly built such facilities and is probably capable of
190Daniel Ford, The Button: The Pentagon's Strategic





surviving a dedicated attack and continuing to function.
The United States must continue to address this aspect of a
survivable command and control system.
The requirement to remain within the bounds set forth in
the Constitution should be adhered to at all costs, and
close involvement of the chains of succession in meeting
this requirement will go far in stabilizing the government
during this challenging period. Reconstitution and
execution of remaining nuclear forces along with
termination of the conflict at a level that denies the
Soviets their war aims and secures the terms most favorable
to the United States and her allies is the end goal that
should be worked toward. 191
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-'-Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
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